

CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST

PRO

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CON

April, 1934

America and the National Defense Problem

What the Constitution Provides

National Defense Act of 1920

The U. S. Army and Navy Today

Modern Trends in Warfare

Pending Air Force Expansion Bills

Should America Have A New
Deal in National Defense?


Should the U. S. Navy be Built
Up to Treaty Strength?

Progress of Major Legislation



WASHINGTON, D.C.

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New Deal in National Defense

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THE QUESTION THIS MONTH:

Should America Have a New Deal in National Defense?

Foreword

SEVERAL more or less disconnected factors, some really pertinent and others merely apparently so, have contributed to an unusual public interest during the current session of Congress in the general problem of National Defense.

From the signing of the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments in 1922, down through the Harding, Coolidge and Hoover Administrations, American international policy showed a distinct trend toward arms reduction and the advocacy of various methods for the outlawing of war, as evidenced by the Kellogg-Briand treaty and the London Naval Treaty of 1930. America practiced what she preached by refraining from keeping her Navy up to what she is entitled to under the Washington and London Treaties in the hope that further reductions would be agreed upon. With the advent of the Roosevelt Administration and the launching of the New Deal, however, there came a change in the White House attitude toward the Army and the Navy.

The first direct evidence appeared when the President, shortly after Congress had voted emergency funds, allotted some of these funds to the Army and some to the Navy, the former for building purposes and the latter for the construction of cruisers, already authorized but not appropriated for by Congress. Later the President showed his sympathy for the Vinson bill to authorize the building up of the American Navy to treaty strength.

All this was sufficient to stir up the controversialists on both sides of every phase of the national defense issue. On top of all this came the President's order cancelling the air mail contracts and turning that job over to the Army Air Corps, to add fuel to the fire. As a matter of actual fact, the air mail incident had no bearing whatever upon the general problem of national defense, but its dramatic character served to focus attention on the Army Air Corps and gave proponents and opponents of an independent air service a golden opportunity to pour out their arguments on a receptive public.

Those who were fully informed on the subject knew that mail carrying was no test of the military efficiency of the Army Air Corps, as was finally borne out by the testimony of Lindbergh, Chamberlain and Rickenbacker before the Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

Representative McSwain of South Carolina, Chairman

of the House Committee on Military Affairs, a strong Army Air Corps advocate, introduced a series of bills designed to increase and improve the Air Corps and his committee is now making a comprehensive study of the problem. A description of these bills and their purpose is given by Mr. McSwain on page 106.

As a result of the controversy over the air mail incident the Secretary of War appointed a special committee, headed by General H. A. Drum, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, to study the capabilities of the Air Corps as a permanent agency for carrying the mails.

This is the committee on which Colonel Lindbergh declined to serve.

If, as seems probable, the carrying of air mail is turned back to commercial companies in the near future, the work of Secretary Dern's committee will be rendered useless.

The Vinson bill to authorize the building of the Navy up to treaty strength is on its way to passage and signature by the President as the *DIGEST* goes to press.

As explained by Mr. Vinson, in his article on page 119, this bill, however, does not guarantee the building of all the ships necessary to meet America's allowance under the treaty. It merely authorizes their construction, leaving the final decision of whether they shall be built to the President.

Thus, the whole question of Army and Navy policy really remains in abeyance. The present set up of the Army under the provisions of the National Defense Act remains virtually unchanged. No action has been taken or is imminent on bills for a separate air corps or for the placing of the Army and the Navy under a Department of National Defense.

Continued reports from Europe and Asia of the possibility of war and renewed pressure by supporters of the League of Nations and the World Court for American participation in those organizations give assurance, however, that the question of America's National Defense policy will continue to receive close attention.

In presenting the facts and Pro and Con discussions of the problem the *DIGEST* has sought to give a general, broad picture of the whole problem. The main points at issue may be stated as follows:

1. Should America cut down on her land and sea forces and strive thus to set an example to the rest of the world

in an effort to aid world peace, or maintain a strong and capable force as a warning against war?

2. Should there be a separate air force?

3. Will aircraft so dominate future wars that the building of battleships and cruisers for the sea and heavy

artillery for the land be a waste of money?

4. Should America pool all her armed forces under a single Department of National Defense?

Arguments on all phases of these questions will be found in the Pro and Con sections.

The U. S. Constitution and National Defense

THE following provisions of the Constitution provide the authority under which the Congress passes and the President administers laws for National defense.

ARTICLE I. Section 8. Par. 1. The Congress shall have Power To * * * provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.

Par. 11. To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.

Par. 12. To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriations of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.

Par. 13. To provide and maintain a Navy.

Par. 14. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.

Par. 15. To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.

Par. 16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Section 10. Par. 3. No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not permit delay.

ARTICLE II. Section 2. Par. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into actual Service of the United States. * * *

Section. 3. Par. 1. He (the President) shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.

AMENDMENT II. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

AMENDMENT III. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Provisions of the National Defense Act

IN 1916 Congress passed the National Defense Act, by which the size of the Army was increased and by which an effort was made to cure some of the ills existing in the Army as then organized.

In 1920, Congress made an exhaustive study of the military force of the United States in the light of the facts brought out by the World War. The result was the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920. It is under the provision of this act that the United States Army now functions.

The main provisions of the Act were the following:

The size of the Army was fixed at 15,034 combat officers, 280,000 enlisted men, and a number of officers for those branches designated as noncombatant, depending on the size of the force,—in all 17,726 officers and 280,000 enlisted men.

The Act made provision for assignment of personnel to branches, thus, in general, directing the relative size of the branches, but provided a method whereby that size might be varied depending on the changing importance of the branches in the scheme of defense.

The General Staff was increased and strengthened by requirements as to eligibility and as to the scope of its activities. The control of the line of the Army was definitely removed from bureaus.

The Act provided that all combat officers should be on a single list for promotion purposes, thus doing away with jealousies of promotion by branches.

The number of officers provided was sufficiently large to provide a full quota for all contemplated units, with a surplus sufficient for training the National Guard, Organized Reserves and other civilian components and agencies and for the necessary supply and administrative functions incident to the operation of all.

Expansion of the peace-time force into that necessary for a major emergency was provided by the creation of the officers reserve corps with its source of supply; the reserve officers' training corps, and the civilian military training camps, with provision for training and instructing all.

The National Guard was strengthened, enlarged, and reorganized so as to conform to the scheme in which it was to follow the Regular Army closely as the first line of defense. A National Guard of 420,000 enlisted men was provided for.

The U. S. War Department and National Defense

Official Statement of the Army

General Staff

In stating the organization of the War Department of the United States and its activities, it is necessary first to arrive at a common understanding of the basic purposes and underlying principles of this organization.

War requires a transformation of human society. The national defense establishment is the instrument for the prompt accomplishment of the military phases of this transformation. Unless the peace-time national defense establishment is adequate, the main features of such a transformation cannot be accomplished efficiently or in time to avoid disaster.

Our own organization is founded on the principle that we must be unready for aggressive war, yet fully capable of defending ourselves. An aggressive motive requires the conscious determination to be so prepared as to be able to select the time and the place for initiating hostilities. To be defensive in motive, as we intend to be, a nation must surrender all thought of initiative.

The first requirement of defensive policy is that there be established garrisons strong enough for immediate protection of oversea possession and outposts and primary frontiers. After the initial blows are parried it must be possible, by redistribution of available forces, to support critical defenses. Into this supporting action would be thrown all immediately available units, which must be assured the steady flow of supplies necessary to maintain them in action. Behind their protection the nation must be ready to effect a rapid mobilization of man-power and industry. Time is an essential factor, not only in establishing and supporting the initial defense, but in striving toward final victory. The speediest possible reestablishment of peace minimizes costs in lives and treasure.

The most economical and efficient peace-time policy of defense is one that provides: (1) the minimum necessary for an active establishment, maintained in the highest state of efficiency (personnel and material) and immediately available for active service; (2) a War Reserve sufficient for its purposes; (3) and comprehensive measures or preparation for mobilization of the national effort. To neglect the active establishment, the War Reserve, or the provisions for mobilizing the nation would be a blunder that might prove fatal.

The National Defense Act

Step by step, in a practical way, the National Defense Act of 1920 provided for meeting the requirements of defensive war. In each phase, it strictly avoided stepping into the forbidden territory in which there might be suspicion of aggressive intentions. Yet in no phase did it neglect full measure of support for the necessities of a peaceful people who are nevertheless earnestly determined to defend their own evolution.

The Regular Army

The National Defense Act provided as the minimum need for a Regular Army a strength of approximately 18,000 officers and 280,000 enlisted men. This force was intended to be the outpost and covering force for the nation. Upon the permanent professional force there devolve certain inescapable responsibilities. It must be instantly ready to meet the best opposition which could be suddenly brought against it. It is also the laboratory in which must be tested new ideas to meet the competition in modernization. It is the model, developed from that laboratory, for those elements of the civilian army that must perform their training in addition to following their primary civil pursuits. It must provide the pool of professional instructors necessary to insure doctrinal coordination. Finally, the Regular Army must carry the burden of providing the overhead establishment necessary for purposes of planning, administration, and coordinating the functioning of the entire National Defense plant.

The National Guard

It has always been the tradition of the American People that we should have a body of troops, purely local in association, organized and partially trained, available for the purposes of the states, yet also available after further preparation for defense of the nation. The National Defense Act continues this tradition in its provision for a National Guard of something over 400,000 men. While the National Guard is lacking in the opportunity to be professionally prepared to the standard of the Regular Army, it is intended, however, to effect a degree of preparation which would materially shorten the period of its essential training after the outbreak of war. To insure this, and also the desired uniformity of organization and equipment, the Federal Government contributes the main fiscal support for the National Guard, and reserves the necessary Federal control for its development.

The War Reserve

Primarily the term "War Reserve" comprehends there being on hand at all times a supply of essential munitions adequate to meet any emergencies which might occur before the industries of the country could produce supplies in sufficient quantities. The conclusion of the World War found our industrial mobilization just beginning to catch up with the requirements. There was on hand a tremendous stock of arms and equipment of all sorts. As a result of this condition the National Defense Act did not go into the question of maintaining such stocks; and did not mention a War Reserve. On the other hand, the Act gives full implication that the available establishment of the Regular Army and the National Guard should be fully prepared in all respects to meet the situations which might confront them, and subsequent acts were intended to provide War Reserves for a minimum of one million men.

The Mobilization of Man-Power

Recognizing the need for prompt mobilization of the man-power of the nation to support the Regular Army

and the National Guard, the National Defense Act created an essential framework for the Organized Reserves.

The first essential of such a reserve was created in the form of the Officers' Reserve Corps. Recognizing that availability of the then existing personnel of the Officers' Reserve Corps would soon lapse, the Act provided an intelligent scheme of replacement through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Citizens' Military Training Camps. Recognition was given to the need for an enlisted reserve.

Mobilization of Industry

Desiring to avoid the expense of maintaining in peace large War Reserves and to meet the requirements of a major emergency, the National Defense Act provided authority for the War Department and inspiration for industries to perform their complementary functions in the preparation for mobilization of industry. The Assistant Secretary of War is specifically charged with administering this important activity, and is authorized the necessary skilled staff.

Overhead

The National Defense Act recognized as an essential fundamental element in the preparedness policy, the maintenance in peace of overhead establishments necessary for adequate planning, training, supervision, storage of reserve supplies, and to facilitate expeditious execution of mobilization in an emergency. Provisions of the Act provide for a War Department, a subdivision of the forces into Armies and other combat units, a territorial subdivision into Corps Areas, the conduct of training schools, supply depots, etc.

Regular Army Strength

The strength of the Regular Army, now supported by appropriations averages approximately 12,000 officers and 118,750 enlisted men exclusive of some 6,500 Philippine Scouts. This is considerably less than half of the minimum enlisted force contemplated by the National Defense Act to perform the missions of garrisons for our overseas possessions, for permanent combat forces in the United States proper, for training civil components, overhead, school and depot systems, etc.

Our overseas outposts are now occupied by garrisons only large enough to cause an aggressor to think twice before attacking them; certainly not strong enough to resist with certainty any attacks that might be brought against them. These total for the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, Alaska and Puerto Rico approximately 2,000 officers and 36,000 enlisted men (including Philippine Scouts).

There are in the United States proper approximately 10,000 officers and 86,000 enlisted men. Deducting the officers and enlisted men assigned to essential overhead, including instruction of civil components, to harbor defenses and to special services, there are normally available in the United States proper approximately 50,000 mobile combat troops. These forces are assigned to large tactical organizations but are distributed throughout the country in the many posts. Availability of housing requires this distribution as well as the requirements for the training of the civilian components.

The 50,000 mobile combat forces are indeed too small to meet the first phases of any major emergency and to

hold an enemy until the National Guard could be hardened and trained for active combat service. Our attempt to maintain a framework sufficient for the necessary War expansion has left us in a serious condition, the full significance of which cannot sensibly be ignored by responsible agencies. These circumstances have been carefully studied by our military leaders with conclusions demanding a minimum Regular Army in peace of 165,000 men. The Regular Army should be increased to this strength without delay. No other agency could possibly take its place as the backbone of defense systems.

National Guard Strength

The National Guard has a total strength of roughly 190,000, less than half the minimum contemplated in the National Defense Act. With pay for 48 drill periods annually, (now cut to 36), and a short summer training of 15 days, this force can be considered as available for active field service only after further preparation. Most of the elements will require a war-time period of hardening and supplemental training to fit them for active mobile operations.

Corps Areas

All the military forces and activities must be grouped regionally, and the primary grouping is by Corps Areas. As far as possible all matters within the Corps Areas are decentralized under control of the respective Corps Area Commanders. The great peace and war-time task of this regional command (Corps Area) is to prepare for and to actually mobilize the units and other forces allotted to the Corps Area. The administration in peace and war of all forces provided by the National Defense Act are functions of the Corps Area.

The Four Armies

In an emergency our combat forces must operate in large strategical and tactical units, independent of the regional commands of the Corps Areas mentioned above. The Army command logically becomes the higher battle command. Our peace-time organization and training should provide for this. Furthermore, we have four national frontiers requiring studies and plans for defense. Consequently, under the authority of the National Defense Act the combat forces in the United States have been organized into four Armies.

Organization for Industrial Mobilization

The National Defense Act assigned the responsibility of the development of industrial mobilization to the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chiefs of the Procuring Arms and Services and their respective staffs. These activities can be generally grouped into two parts, the determination of requirements, and the arrangements for procurement.

The determination of requirements is in itself a complicated and lengthy process, resulting finally in designs with corresponding specifications which are approved as standard by the Secretary of War. Through the operation of procurement districts there is created a complete plan of procurement for war. Finally, there must be a complete coordination in the use of the industries of the country in war-time by the different interested services. In war this is a function of the President and civilian assistants, but in peace, under the terms of the National Defense Act, it is a subject of continual study by the Assistant Secretary of War.

Organization of the War Department

The complex character of modern armies, and above all the magnitude of war-time transformation problems, as well as peace-time administration have made necessary the evolution of an intricate organization in the War Department by which the processes of war and preparation for war can be effectively planned and directed. It is the result of Congressional enactments based mainly on the advice of our leaders in the World War. It is a product of the World War experience and an important instrument of the National Defense Act of 1920.

The fundamental principles upon which this organization is based may be summarized as follows:

(a) The civil and political head of the War Department is the Secretary of War whose primary functions are sub-divided into two main categories, i.e., non-military and military.

(b) The non-military functions are charged mainly to The Assistant Secretary of War and relate to the creation of a system and method by which the industries, etc., of the nation will produce in peace and war the supplies required by the military forces as announced by the Chief of Staff.

(c) The military functions rest in the hands of the Chief of Staff and relate to all military aspects of National Defense.

(d) Coordination of the above functions is secured by the War Council comprising the Secretary of War, The Assistant Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

(e) To give technical advice and to put into effect the plans and decisions of The Assistant Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff in their respective roles are the Chief of Arms and Services on the one hand and the Corps Area and Department Commanders on the other.

The functions of the Assistant Secretary of War are mainly statutory as prescribed in the National Defense Act. These include policies and decisions relating to current procurement and planning and developing war-time procurement. A small staff of experts assist him in this work, while the chiefs of arms and services furnish the technical advice and execute his decisions. Associated with this office is the school called the Industrial College for the training of officers in industrial mobilization duties.

The functions of the Chief of Staff are mainly statutory as prescribed in the National Defense Act. The Chief of Staff is also the Commanding General of the Field Forces. To assist him in planning and coordination of execution he has the War Department General Staff. These duties group themselves into specific functions common to the whole Army in contradistinction to any one subordinate command or branch. As the advice desired by the Chief of Staff should be based on consideration of the whole Army, the General Staff organization is intended to secure such an end. In other words, "Command" study and advice is the essence of the mission of the General Staff and forms the basis for its functional organization. Its main functions relate to defense plans, utilization of available funds, means and forces to perfect defense plans, and coordination of all agencies in furtherance thereof.

Modern Trends in Warfare

by General Douglas MacArthur
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

THE inevitable trend in modern warfare is toward greater speed of strategic maneuver through maximum utilization of relatively fast machines for transportation; increased fire-power on the battlefield through employment of weapons of much greater efficiency, with a resultant wider dispersion in tactical formations; more power in the attack through utilization of combat vehicles invulnerable to small-arms fire and capable of cross-country travel; growing dependency upon air forces for information, for assistance in defense of the coast line, for attacks against hostile ground troops, and for bombardment of sensitive points in the enemy's supply organization. All these things point to the probability that any major war of the reasonably proximate future will see a swing away from the tremendous and ponderous combat forces that have characterized campaigns of the past 75 years and that in their place will appear relatively mobile, highly trained, and very powerful, though somewhat smaller, formations. Control of such units in combat would be difficult, if not impossible, with old methods, but fortunately, alongside other technical developments, there have been comparable ones in signal communications to facilitate teamwork and coordinated action.

Tactical units such as those described must be supported by stronger maintenance, supply, and other auxiliary services than have heretofore been required. The conception of the "nation in arms" will not be abandoned, but in its application a smaller proportion of populations will probably be included in the actual fighting elements of armies than was the case during the World War, and a greater one will be engaged in producing the airplanes, tanks, guns, trucks, ammunition, and other intricate weapons that will be rapidly used up on the battlefield.

As heretofore pointed out, the physical aspects of such changes will occur very slowly and gradually, unless the world should find itself again confronted with the catastrophe of a major war. But trends of this description must be recognized and evaluated by a military establishment, so that in emergency its efforts to protect the nation will be effective under conditions then prevailing. In a major crisis defeat would certainly follow slavish devotion to outmoded method and obsolete ideas.

To the greatest extent practicable our own Army is striving to adjust its organization, training, doctrine, and tactical methods to insure maximum readiness in this respect. The four-army plan envisions a prompt mobilization of a few hundred thousand of the best trained combat troops available rather than the immediate assembly of millions of men totally unacquainted with the requirements and technique of modern warfare. Experimental and development work in weapons, transportation, fighting vehicles, and related items is carried on as intensively as practicable under current appropriations, so as to attain a moderate degree of preparedness to meet the condition that may reasonably be expected to develop.

The complexion of an army is slow to change—a military truism that has held good from the beginning

of historical time. So pronounced is this tendency, particularly in periods of peace, that within the restricted experience of any single generation, military establishments are likely to appear to the layman as exceedingly stable, if not static, organisms. Yet the only unchanging element in armies is man himself. On the battlefield he is emotional, sometimes unreliable, and easily incapacitated, but in his mental, moral, and physical characteristics he is not noticeably different from the soldier of 25 centuries ago. All else undergoes constant change and though the process is at times so gradual as to be almost imperceptible except to the technician, its cumulative effects are so pronounced that the military tactics, weapons, equipment, organization, and methods of supply of any particular epoch of the world's history have often but faintly resembled those of the one next preceding. Each partial step by which such changes take place represents a definite increase in combat effectiveness. Failure to accomplish any one of them introduces an element of obsolescence into an army, and their continued neglect during years of peace might well result, should war occur, in military defeat and national disaster.

In modern times probably the most important causes for changes in battle methods are new discoveries or inventions affecting weapons or equipment. But in seeking to forecast the immediate effects of any particular invention upon organization and tactics, there must be recognized certain practical considerations that tend to modify theoretical results.

One of these considerations is that, while the basic idea of a new weapon may be instantaneously evolved, mechanical efficiency is normally attained by a step-by-step process. The powerful field gun of today bears little resemblance to the crude weapon of the fourteenth century, but if all intervening models could be assembled for a single inspection, it would be appreciated how slowly the transformation has taken place, and how gradually, therefore, it has dictated changes in battle formations and methods. Within the space of a hundred years railways have produced marked changes in the transportation and supply of armies. But their present efficiency has been very laboriously attained, and their degree of usefulness to armies has increased at an exactly similar rate. Even now railroads are not always available where needed by an army, and for isolated and specialized operations the transportation methods of the ancient Romans are still in vogue. Other weapons and auxiliary equipment have gone through a similar evolution, though in modern times successive improvements follow each other at greater speed than formerly.

Another modifying influence is that almost simultaneously with the appearance of a new weapon, technicians undertake the task of developing against it neutralizing methods or mechanisms. Thus the tank, which was produced to assist in breaking through the defensive fires of machine guns and other automatic small arms, was partially answered by the antitank gun, armor-piercing bullet, the tank trap and the .50 caliber machine gun. These counterdevelopments have already compelled tank designers to increase the weight of protective armor originally considered necessary and this, of course, has caused changes in power plants and other important features of combat vehicles. For some weapons the principal defense is equipment of similar type, employed either directly against the same class of weapons in the

opposing force, or in threatened or actual retaliation. The airplane is a particularly good illustration of this class, although it has brought forth also extraordinary developments in antiaircraft artillery and machine guns. So through the list of weapons and equipment there is discernible this neutralizing tendency, operating to limit the effect of any particular one upon organization and tactics. Moreover, the many different types and kinds of weapons, equipment and appliances required by an army are each employed for specific purposes. No single item has universal application to all conditions and to all situations, and as a consequence the degree of its influence upon battle methods is invariably circumscribed by its own limitations in applicability.

But probably the most important of these practical considerations is expense. Improvement in weapons and equipment is a continuing process, and complete replacement each time a more efficient type is developed would involve prohibitive costs. The most that can be done in peace is to develop pilot models, secure small quantities for thorough test and development of tactics, maintain a few units satisfactorily equipped for emergency use, and insure that upon the outbreak of any major war manufacture will be initiated in the most modern rather than in obsolete types. To greater or less degree all nations are forced to observe this limitation in the procurement of munitions. From these conditions has sprung the fairly accurate generalization that an army invariably begins a war with the weapons left over from the preceding one. It strives to improve its position in this regard as far as possible, and to develop methods for employing new models and for defense against them, but its general training must be based upon weapons in its possession rather than upon those it hopes to obtain.

The combined result of all these modifying influences is that the military advantages to be immediately obtained through the invention of a new engine or agent of destruction always fall short of those envisioned by theorists. The war chariot, the longbow, the blunderbuss, the wheeled cannon—each in its turn has made its appearance and, in spite of obvious limitations upon its usefulness, has been acclaimed by its particular school of supporters as the ultimate in military effectiveness. In more modern times the magazine rifle, smokeless powder, the machine gun, the airplane, toxic gases, and the tank have been greeted in a similar fashion. History demonstrates, however, that none of them has suddenly disrupted organization or revolutionized battle methods. But each has exerted a definite influence, and in general the most successful armies have been those whose leaders have been quickest to appreciate new possibilities and to develop methods for exploiting the advantages offered thereby.

A major responsibility of the War Department General Staff is to keep abreast of all current developments applicable to the conduct of war, and to anticipate the trends in organization, equipment, tactics, and training that may logically be expected to result.

Many technical and industrial advances of the past decade carry unusual significance for the Army. They include the remarkable improvements constantly being made in the speed, reliability, and endurance of airplanes; the great strides toward perfecting antiaircraft matériel; the increasing ability of certain types of motor vehicles to operate over relatively difficult terrain; new develop-

ments in armor-piercing bullets; the production of satisfactory machine guns of small weight; the development of an efficient shoulder arm capable of semiautomatic fire; the enormous increase in the use of motor cars, both passenger and cargo; and the extra-ordinary progress that has been made in good road construction. Alongside these are many others that promise increased mobility for the whole Army and greater efficiency in

artillery, chemicals, signal communication, and supply.

Each arm and service of the Military Establishment is seeking to utilize current scientific developments for the enhancement of its own battle effectiveness. The specific objectives are to facilitate the exercise of leadership by improving the efficiency of communications and to increase the fire power and mobility of every arm in every component of the army.—*Extracts, see 3, p. 128.*

Military Forces of Nations of the World (As of December 31, 1933)

NATION	Population	ORGANIZED FORCES				Per Cent of Population	REMARKS
		Active	Trained Reserve	Separate Air Force (If Any)	Total		
Argentina	12,010,000	34,798	309,454		344,252	2.86	
Austria	6,700,000	*30,000			30,000	.44	*Includes 8,000 short term men.
Belgium	8,092,000	89,224	495,000		584,224	7.22	
Bolivia	3,010,000	50,000			50,000	1.67	
Brazil	40,472,650	85,199	171,188		256,387	0.64	
British Empire	449,583,000	396,259	696,946	48,782	1,141,987	0.25	
Australia	6,500,000	1,515	28,341	1,344	31,173	0.48	
Canada	10,354,000	3,703	91,873	1,006	96,582	0.93	
Great Britain	46,189,445	199,804	284,278	45,626	529,708	1.10	
India	353,000,000	170,623	113,000		283,623	0.08	
Irish Free State	2,971,992	6,177	17,723	163	24,063	0.80	
New Zealand	1,443,070	618	3,764	122	4,504	0.31	
South Africa	8,000,000	989	135,017	521	136,527	1.70	
Colonies & Depend.	21,124,493	12,830	22,950		35,780	0.12	
Bulgaria	5,006,000	33,000			33,000	.55	
Chile	4,402,000	22,103	177,120	1,325	200,548	4.55	
China	470,000,000	2,000,000		4,600	2,004,600	0.43	Not including Communists.
Colombia	7,851,000	10,982	40,000		50,982	0.65	
Costa Rica	516,031	500	5,000		5,500	1.06	
Cuba	3,962,244	11,816	4,735		16,551	0.42	
Czechoslovakia	14,916,000	*158,000	1,489,000		1,647,000	11.04	*This includes 21,000 police.
Denmark	3,551,000	8,100	65,700	1,100	74,900	2.1	
Dominican Republic ..	1,250,000	2,179			2,179	0.17	
Ecuador	2,500,000	5,252	25,000		30,252	1.22	
Estonia	1,120,500	13,480	*30,500		43,980	3.82	*No new data.
Finland	*3,600,000	*31,575	*345,000		376,575	10.45	*No new data.
France	48,000,000	584,300	*6,328,000	39,913	6,952,213	14.49	*Includes Air Reserve.
Germany	65,300,000	100,500	*1,000,000		1,100,500	1.69	*Nazi Storm Troops.
Greece	6,483,000	85,875	495,042	2,533	583,450	9.43	
Guatemala	2,454,000	6,783	133,850		140,633	5.73	
Haiti	2,500,000	2,494			2,494	0.09	
Honduras	854,184	2,328	456		2,784	0.33	
Hungary	8,683,740	35,800			35,800	0.41	
Italy	44,566,968	437,368	5,885,000	*173,171	6,495,535	14.57	*Includes Air Reserve.
Japan	93,840,785	225,000	1,952,000		2,177,000	2.34	
Latvia	1,900,045	21,650	*190,000		211,650	11.13	*No new data.
Lithuania	2,421,848	*19,466	*52,000		71,466	2.85	*No new data.
Mexico	17,000,000	59,249	39,962		116,897	0.69	
Netherlands	7,731,000	29,500	330,000		358,500	4.63	
Nicaragua	750,000	2,891			2,891	0.39	
Norway	2,811,000	15,100	315,000		330,100	11.71	
Paraguay	900,000	40,000			40,000	4.44	
Peru	6,737,000	9,045	20,000		29,045	0.47	
Poland	32,120,000	325,456	1,721,579		2,047,035	6.47	
Portugal	6,600,000	39,800	380,000		419,800	6.36	
Romania	13,057,074	295,827	1,305,000		1,600,827	8.87	
Russia	165,700,000	830,000	15,376,000		16,206,000	9.79	
Salvador	1,459,578	3,370	27,784		31,154	2.13	
Spain	24,600,000	203,033	2,095,000		2,298,033	9.34	
Sweden	6,136,000	33,500	*841,700	925	876,125	14.3	*Includes 3,400 Air Corps Res.
Switzerland	4,077,000	494	629,600		630,000	15.49	
Turkey	13,660,276	133,000	532,800		665,800	4.87	
Uruguay	1,941,000	6,629	9,300		15,929	0.82	
Venezuela	3,226,000	8,000			8,000	0.25	
Yugoslavia	14,300,000	136,990	1,552,724		1,689,714	11.40	
United States	*125,693,000	135,052	309,609		444,661	0.35	*Estimate, July 1, 1933.

Comparison of Bills Affecting the Air Corps

National Defense Act (as amended).

HR-7553

1. Organization of the Army

Provides for organization of the Army into brigades, divisions, army corps and armies; the division of the U. S. into corps and Army areas; and for certain branches and services in the War Department, under general control of the Chief of Staff.

No change.

2. General Staff

Under the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, the General Staff prepares plans for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, mobilizing, training and demobilizing the Army of the United States for National Defense; also plans for the conduct of operations.

No change.

3. Procurement

Charges the Assistant Secretary of War with the supervision of procurement of supplies for the Army.

No change.

4. Personnel:—

a. Strength:—

(1) Officer.

Provides 12,403 officers in the Regular Army, 1,650 of whom are allotted to the Air Corps.

Provides that the increase in commissioned strength of the Regular Army from 12,000 to 12,403, authorized by the Air Corps Act of July 2, 1926, shall be reached as soon as practicable. Thereafter, the officer strength shall be augmented to correspond to any increase in the number of planes decided upon from time to time.

(2) Enlisted Men.

Provides for 286,240 enlisted men in the Regular Army. Fiscal limitations in effect July 2, 1926, as modified by the Act of July 2, 1926, limit the effective enlisted strength of the Regular Army to 131,240, 16,000 of whom are allotted to the Air Corps.

Provides that the increase in the enlisted strength of the Regular Army from 125,000 to 131,240, authorized by the Air Corps Act of July 2, 1926, shall be reached as soon as practicable. Thereafter, the enlisted strength is to be augmented to correspond to the increase in the number of planes.

b. Promotion.

Promotion in the combat branches takes place by seniority when vacancies occur on the single promotion list. Air Corps officers may be assigned temporarily to higher command and staff duty with appropriate temporary increased rank, pay and allowances, the advance being limited to two grades.

No change.

c. Retirement

Officers have a right to be retired at the age of 64, when incapacitated for active duty, and after 40 years' service. They may be retired at the age of 62 and after 30 years' service.

No change.

5. Airplanes, equipment and accessories.

There are now authorized 1,800 serviceable airplanes, with the necessary equipment and accessories.

Provides for general increase (with a 25% reserve) in airplanes, equipment and accessories as conditions warrant and necessity demands. The increase over the next 5 years is limited to not more than 2,000 serviceable airplanes with the necessary equipment and accessories.

HR-7601

Creates a separate air force under the Chief of Air Corps, independent of GHQ, Army, and subordinate tactical units and their commanders. The Chief of Air Corps is to be a Lieutenant General responsible directly to the Secretary of War. It really establishes a separate Air Corps within the War Department.

Takes away from the General Staff and gives to the Chief of Air Corps practically all the General Staff functions pertaining to the Air Corps and military aviation.

Removes the Air Corps almost entirely from the supervision of the Assistant Secretary of War in the matter of procurement for technical equipment.

Provides 5,575 officers in the Air Corps stating whether there shall be a corresponding increase in the strength of the Army as a whole or at the expense of the remainder of the Army. Limits entrance to the Air Corps to Second Lieutenants.

Provides 32,804 enlisted men in the Air Corps without stating where the increase is to come from.

Prescribes a separate promotion list for the Air Corps and advancement to the next higher grade after 3, 7, 12, 20 and 26 years of service. This means exceedingly rapid promotion for all officers now in the Air Corps, a large part of whom would advance two grades in 5 years.

Air Corps officers shall be retired upon application at the age of 54, and after 30 years' service. For this service all time spent on flying duty, except in time of war, counts $1\frac{1}{2}$. This bill also creates a new limited retired list (called the limited active duty list) of 316 officers who are entitled to compensation at the rate of 75% of all pay and allowances received by them at the time of retirement.

Provides not less than 4,834 airplanes, together with the necessary equipment and accessories, to be attained over a five-year period.

HR-7872

The Chief of Air Corps is to be directly responsible to the Secretary of War in matters relating to Military Aviation. Practically, a separate Air Corps within the War Department is created.

Same as HR-7601.

Same as HR-7601.

Provides 1,650 officers in the Air Corps, vacancies to be taken from the rest of the Regular Army. Limits entrance to the Air Corps to Second Lieutenants. Authorizes 5,576 officers in the Air Corps, to be reached as the President desires.

Provides 16,000 enlisted men in the Air Corps, generally with high grades and ratings; the strength, grades and ratings of the rest of the Regular Army to be reduced accordingly. Contains general authorization for 32,804 enlisted men in the Air Corps, to be attained as the President deems advisable.

Prescribes a separate promotion list for the Air Corps. Advancement on this promotion list is to be by seniority. The rest of the Regular Army promotions are suspended until the Air Corps allotment is filled.

No change.

Authorizes a general increase, as the President deems advisable, to 4,834 airplanes with necessary equipment and accessories.

Should America Have a New Deal in National Defense?

P R O

Arguments Favoring

DURING the present session of Congress I have introduced in the House three bills seeking to promote the defense of our Nation by a more efficient and better organized system of air power. I have in mind a threefold plan of developing air power. This is because I am fully convinced that the most effective and most economical means of defending the Nation against invasion by any foreign foe is air power. I know that we must have a navy and that we must have an army of ground troops, but if we have sufficient strength in air power we may never actually have to use the navy or the ground army.

In other words, adequate preparation in air power will mean the discouragement of war by any possible enemy and this will mean the promotion of peace. Undoubtedly all of our people are peace loving and simply wish to be let alone. Our military policy is one of defense pure and simple. We have a great expanse of territory stretching from ocean to ocean, with a friendly people on the north and friendly nations on the south. Our country is so large and so varied in resources that we are practically self-sufficient. We can endure a war longer than any other nation on earth, and with least inconvenience to our people. We have the semi-tropical products of Florida, and we have all the other resources, both agricultural and mineral, necessary to carry on our ordinary pursuits and at the same time conduct a war.

Therefore, it is the fixed policy of our Nation not to prepare for a war of aggression. No other nation has any territory or any resources that we covet. We desire merely to be let alone and to be allowed to develop our own resources and our own people. If it were left to America to be the aggressor and thus to provoke any war, there never would be another war. But America cannot control the attitude and actions of other nations. Therefore, if any other nation for some imaginary grievance, or to enrich her own people at our expense, should attack us, it is necessary that we defend ourselves. Surely there is not a right-minded person in America that would complain that we fight in defense of our own land and of our own people. But we do not wish to have to fight. If we are strong in air power and adequately strong in the Navy and in ground troops, no other nation would attempt to invade us. They would be doomed to defeat and perhaps to destruction. No nation would be foolish enough to deliberately commence a war without feeling that it had an even chance to win.

But if our Nation is weak in the instrumentalities of defense, then it will invite war from jealous and envious nations. Under modern scientific conditions, it is manifest that the most powerful factor in any future war, and especially in its earlier stages, will be air power.

by Hon. John J. McSwain
U. S. Representative, S. C.
Democrat
Chairman House Committee
on Military Affairs

With sufficient air strength we can prevent the landing of troops seeking to invade our Nation. Our air force, operating in conjunction with the Navy, can surely prevent foreign troops from landing. However, as extra and abundant precaution, we should preserve our coast defenses as they now are and keep an adequate ground Army which can be readily expanded and enlarged to safe proportions, so that no other nation will attack us. We hope never to be drawn away from the American continent in the conduct of any future war. We are relinquishing our sovereignty in the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos wish to be independent and we have promised them their independence, and have enacted a statute whereby their independence will be gradually restored to them. We will keep our faith with the Philippines in that respect, and in all other respects. Therefore, our whole military policy, which means land forces, air forces, and sea forces, is governed, controlled, and determined by considerations of defense and of defense only.

With these general considerations in mind I have sought to point the way to strengthen our air defenses with the minimum of expense and outlay. On February 2, 1934, I introduced H. R. 7601 to increase the efficiency of the Air Corps of the Regular Army. This organization is the backbone of our air defense. It will train not only officers and men to fight in the air in time of war and to carry out other air missions, but it will train the Reserve elements in our air forces, and thus supply a reservoir of trained pilots to fight in the air if any nation should attempt to invade our shores.

Again on February 5, 1934, I introduced H. R. 7657, for the better organizing and training of the Air Reserves. This element of our national defense consists of young men who have obtained training as pilots and have received commissions as Reserve officers in the Air Corps of the United States Army, and are ready at any instant to be called into the service of the Nation. My purpose is to insure more thorough and satisfactory tactical training for these Reserve officers of the Air Corps. They are men of the highest patriotism, who are willing to give of their time and strength and talents in order to keep themselves ready for a national emergency. It is very little to ask of the Nation to give them some training each year in formation flying so that they may the better be prepared to fight, if fight they must.

On January 29, 1934, I introduced H. R. 7413, to organize the Junior Air Corps Reserve as a civilian component of the United States Army. I believe this is a most constructive piece of legislation. It encourages all

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Should America Have a New Deal in National Defense?

Arguments Opposing

C O N

DUE to an unremitting, though distorted publicity, many Americans are predisposed to the belief that the airplane will dominate future war, and that the possession of a powerful air force, alone, will make our country safe. Such a belief, no doubt, provides the incentive for bills now pending in Congress, which, at an annual increase in cost of a quarter of a billion dollars, would provide us with nearly as many modern military airplanes as the combined military aviation strength of any other two nations on earth. Such a belief is romantic.

The military airplane is a valuable weapon, but it has now, and will have as far into the future as can be foreseen, too many limitations to enable it to be decisive, alone. It can act only when in the air. On the ground it is helpless. Yet it is vitally dependent upon the ground. It requires an extensive, complicated, and extremely vulnerable ground organization which comprises about 80% of the total aviation personnel of an army. Such an organization will sustain the airplane in but limited ventures into the air, during which it is capable of spectacular, but momentary achievement. It is deficient in power of sustained fire, which alone can shake determined resistance. It completely lacks ability to close with an opponent. As demonstrated in the American battles of the World War and frequently since, its ventures are at the mercy of weather. It could no more stand alone than could artillery. Unless its ground organization is adequately protected against hostile ground forces, a large air force would have little decisive and no lasting effect. A disproportionate air force, supported by deficient ground forces, would fall easy prey to an enemy who has created a unified team, with uniformly developed balance of forces.

An air force can attack only by fire, or by dropping of projectiles. Fire is an important agency of combat, but not alone a decisive one. The destruction of armies or populations by projectiles and gas alone is a phantasy of the dreamer. Actual capture of the enemy or the occupation of vital areas is essential before a determined foe can be defeated. An air force alone cannot accomplish these results. The use of balanced forces of destruction, including the due proportion of hand workers on the ground, is necessary. An enemy approaching our shores would be too much concerned over the progress of his ships and his armies to be willing to waste efforts in meaningless aerial bombardment. Such actions beget nothing but increased bitterness of conflict. An enemy would doubtless experiment with some tentative aerial raiding, in hopes of causing a diversion of our main efforts. Such efforts, like the bombing of London during the World War, are not decisive in their effects upon the main issues of war.

by

Hon. George H. Dern

U. S. Secretary of War

Our own history should convince us that Americans will not yield, supinely to the brutality of indiscriminate raiding.

To assume the destruction of armies by attack from the air appears rash. The impressive results of aerial target practice against inanimate objects cannot be taken as a criterion of war. The aviator is human, just like the infantryman who can shoot the spots out of paper targets, yet whose fire scatters all over the landscape when confronted by an opposing human will to destruction. Progress of aerial gunnery has been no more rapid than the progress of antiaircraft fire from the ground. Those demonstrations in which aviators riddle the targets upon which they dive mean very little indeed to the infantryman who, from the experience of his own training, derives confidence that airplanes which approach so close to the ground are going to be shot down like wild ducks from the blind. If the aviator remains at high altitude he can only drop bombs. Harrassed by the fire of antiaircraft artillery, his bombing will be no more accurate nor decisive than the fire of distant artillery; yet far more costly in respect to quantity production.

In land warfare, an air force will be of great value from two viewpoints. Its great mobility coupled with a great though temporary concentration of destructive fires, renders it a most valuable weapon of opportunity. It can be used decisively in a crisis and, when its action is properly coordinated with a ground attack, may strike the decisive blow. Then again it will be of great value in destructive action against distant strategical objectives such as centers and arteries of production, transportation and storage. To be of maximum effect upon the conduct of war, such efforts must be intimately related to the general strategy of war, including primarily the movements of ground forces. It is obvious that balanced action of a unified effort will include the best possible means for protection of such critical centers and arteries. This protection will be gained by elastic distribution of facilities; by disposition of antiaircraft defenses; and by the supporting action of friendly aviation. The support of friendly aviation is of extreme importance, and will be furnished by attacks upon hostile aviation, at times in the air but, when possible, against airdromes. It becomes obvious that aerial operations in war are by no means so simple as might appear to the layman after perusal of the front page of his newspaper. The combined intelligence of an Army knows fully the relative values involved, and therefore is so insistent upon measures which will insure balanced and harmonious action.

Admitting all that has been said, the zealot may still hold that a large air force will at least protect our coasts

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McSwain, *Cont'd*

persons between the ages of 18 and 21 to learn to become pilots so that they, too, may be a reservoir from which Reserves may be finally withdrawn, and also from which the Air Corps itself may be finally supplied with flying material, both officers and enlisted men. Flying is not only the work but actually is the sport of young men. All the boys of the Nation are filled with an ardent love for flying. If this enthusiasm can be capitalized for the defense of the Nation it will be a great asset. Under my plan, perhaps 10,000 young men may annually be graduated into the Junior Air Corps Reserves with practically no expense to the Nation. These young persons love the sport of flying so much and will be so inspired by the thought that they may be of service to the country, and will receive some suitable recognition of such service, that they will give of their money and of their time in order to prepare themselves for this kind of service. I am receiving many responses from all parts of the country to this suggestion, and I believe it is bound to be one of the most far-reaching and useful defense measures ever suggested to the Congress. It appeals to the love of daring and the spirit of adventure in all youth, and turns these youthful traits into the service of the Nation without cost or charge. It contains vast possibilities for good.—*Extracts, see 2, p. 128.*

by Robert Wohlforth

Author and Military Expert

A NEW policy in aviation, civil and military, is rapidly being formulated by this Congress. The real need is not only for a new deal in air defense matters, but for a new deal in our entire scheme of national defense.

Today we are about to pile a vast air armada upon a billion dollar navy upon a potential war army of 4,000,000-10,000,000 men. No one knows what we intend to do with this gargantuan force, no one knows how we intend to use it. There is, however, certainly about one aspect of it. If we continue to add to this ever-mounting "defense" machine, it will topple over upon us. The result will be chaos and bloodshed, with most of our civilization buried under the pile of debris.

We are proceeding upon this unparalleled armament program because we have not even a semblance of a national policy related to military and naval defense. Preparedness advocates claim that our National Defense Act of 1920 constitutes a "national defense policy." As a matter of fact, this piece of legislation is nothing more than a means to provide for man-power mobilization. This Act implies the existence of a national defense policy, but it does not define any objectives whatever. For instance, General Summerall in his final report as

Chief of Staff, wrote that the organizations formed under authority of the National Defense Act do "not bring into existence a military policy. These several elements exist only as a means for effecting a progressive mobilization of manpower."

From time to time the pundits of our Navy Department have uttered various reasons for the justification of larger and more expensive naval armament. They have contended that the Navy must defend all our insular possessions, protect our coasts, insure a 6% return upon capital invested in Latin and South American countries and extend our trade routes throughout the world. In many quarters these pronouncements have been accepted as our national policy. In fact, many of them are at variance with policies laid down by our State Department and none of them have used as guides in our diplomatic relations with various countries. All of them, like the pronouncements of our military men, are part of a "big stick" diplomacy; i. e., if the United States builds an army and a navy large enough peace will be eternal and foreign countries will be anxious to trade with us.

On the other hand several of our Presidents have enunciated national and international policies which appear to be more in keeping with our present world position. In his speech accepting renomination for President, Mr. Hoover said, "I insist upon an army and a navy of a strength which guarantees that no foreign soldier will land on American soil." President Roosevelt has proclaimed a policy of non-intervention and the Democratic platform calls for reduction of the armament burden now carried by the American taxpayer.

These Presidential statements, however, do not constitute a national defense policy. We still subscribe to a Gilbert and Sullivan idea of what we, as a young and lusty nation, want to do about naval and military affairs. Some days this idea sounds like the roaring of an over-virile giant. Less frequently it sounds like the cooing of an anemic dove. On the one hand there is a large number who feel that we must be heavily armed and prepared at all times to avoid the losses and expense and delay that have occurred every time we have engaged in hostilities with another power. On the other hand, there are a number of people who feel that a course of progressive disarmament would better our economic and international position and set an excellent example for all world powers. Half way between these two groups is a third group that feels that our army and our navy should be scrapped in favor of a super-air force of thousands of modern war aircraft.

All of these groups are destined to continued ineffectiveness, perpetual confusion and mutual recrimination because none of them has stopped to ask, first, what do we want to defend, how are we going to defend it and what ought our national policy to be? For instance, the present attempt to super-impose a gigantic air force upon our already potent naval and military establishments takes on an air of unreal grotesqueness. It has been seriously proposed that the United States at once build an underground "air fortress" in Alaska. The air advocates pushing this measure forget that the Washington Treaty

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Dern, *Cont'd*

from the approach of a hostile fleet. Once more we must remember that the destruction of a single, undefended ship is nothing like the attack upon an organized fleet, equipped with the best antiaircraft defense, and supported from the air. A fleet can operate at night, in fog, and in weather when airplanes are helpless, if not indeed chained to the ground. Capital ships are supported by cordons of speedy auxiliaries, all equipped for antiaircraft fire. Even in the best of weather, to approach such a formidable armada, to single out the critical targets, and to attack decisively in face of fire from above and below would be far different from striking at a defenseless hulk. It would be a grave error to assume that a large air force, alone, is a protection of our coastline. At sea, as on land, a balanced fighting team is likely to be superior to the most spectacular individualism.

In short, an air force is far too costly, in view of its limitations, to be considered an agency for general destruction. It is a weapon of opportunity. The most important contribution that an air force can make to success in war is to aid our armies or navies to win victories. Properly directed it is capable of delivering powerful blows, by surprise, at the crisis of an action. It is of utmost value as an agency for harassment, for localized destruction, and for general observation. It is not an economic substitute for any of the other arms and services in an Army. Regardless of cost, it cannot possibly substitute for the basic combat elements on the ground. It is a valuable agency for support of ground or sea forces in defense of our outposts, our coast lines, and our territory. Its true value as such can be obtained only when it operates as a member of the defense team, subordinated like all other elements to whatever team it happens to accompany. Its true development cannot be obtained unless plans and concepts for its use are woven into the common cloth, with all of the adjustment and compromise necessary in creation of harmony.

This legislation would dishearten and embitter the American ground soldier. The most dangerous and arduous task in war is that of the junior officer of infantry, whether he be regular, national guardsman, or reserve. His is an humble task, not lending itself to the colorful treatment so often accorded tales of combat in the air. The individual football lineman seldom if ever receives the plaudits of the grandstand. Yet the work of the lineman in football or war is of primary importance. The junior officer of the combat arms, on the ground, knows what the casual publicist may forget, that the essence of war consists in effective leading of American citizens, supported by effective weapons and machines on land, in the air, and at sea. The humble lieutenant of infantry works just as hard as does his brother officer in the Air Corps, yet he has been paid much less. He reads in the papers that the air force will decide all future wars, but in his heart he knows that this is not true. He cannot but observe that the plaudits of the crowd are for his friend, the aviator. Year by year he has seen his tiny, skeletonized units grow smaller and smaller to make up increments for expansion of the Air Corps. Reserve infantrymen see more and more of reserve appropriations go into the air. This has all been

accepted in good faith. The good soldier knows that the Air Corps, a new arm, needed the sustenance of the matrix to permit it to be built to a balanced proportion. There has been no bitterness of complaint, even over disparity of pay. This is indeed remarkable, for the ground officer knows that a soldier is a soldier whether in the air or on the ground. He also knows that in some other armies the basic pilot is not even given a commission, since he has no need to be a leader of men. In short, the ground officer knows, though he has not yet proclaimed, that the Air Corps has already been given such support as to insure a development beyond that of an efficient balance.

This legislation would, in marked degree, enlarge one branch beyond balanced proportions, still at the expense of the ground arms and services. Promotion on the ground is to be held up, pending completion of this munificent program. The pitifully small companies, troops, and batteries, on the ground, are to drop a few more of their meager grades and ratings. Facilities for training reserve officers, already deficient, must be affected in proportion. All, supposedly, for modernization. The soldier on the ground, whether he be officer or enlisted man, knows that modernization has been delayed in our ground arms far more than it has in the air. The army knows that the ground arms need new machines just as desperately as does the air arm. Modern infantry will need semi-automatic rifles, light machine guns, and modern tanks in considerable numbers. Artillery must have improved weapons and transport and efficient antiaircraft weapons. Cavalry must keep some of its horses, yet also obtain armored cars and combat vehicles. Yet, because of the lack of public interest in the less spectacular forces of war, practically none of these are in sight.

A land based air force, without effective ground forces would be little more than a provocation for a well-prepared and balanced hostile force. The only sane policy of defense is to insure a balanced progress for all essential elements. Before proceeding with an unmeasured development of the Air Corps, there is urgent need for consideration of a program which would modernize the ground forces to the degree already reached by our air forces. Such a program would necessitate the provision of modernized primary weapons for the combat arms, which we do not now have. It would necessitate the creation of effective nuclei for mechanized forces which could be expanded in war. Such a nucleus for the infantry must include great numbers of tanks and cross country cars; and for the cavalry combat cars, armored cars, scout cars, and reconnaissance cars. These effective nuclei are now lacking. Our program must also include modernization of army transportation which is but partially contemplated under current, special provisions. Finally, it must include the building of an effective war reserve in all essential materials, including aerial bombs and ammunition of all sorts. The lack of a war reserve would handicap us, in war, far more than any shortage of airplanes. To further enlarge our Air Corps, beyond that recommended, without due consideration for a balanced development of the whole army, such as generally outlined above, would be distortion and would risk defeat in war.—*Extracts, see 4, p. 128.*

Wohlforth, Cont'd

of 1922 forbids such construction in Pacific Waters. But even though it were permissible, such an act would constitute an international incident whose dangerous implications none could foresee.

Even more irrational has been the attempt to make all aviation an adjunct of national defense. The airmail subsidies were granted with this end in view. Yet we have only to turn back to 1917 to realize that aviation of a commercial nature can have but the slightest value to our military or naval forces. In the hectic war days of 1917 and 1918 all the transportation of the country was taxed to its uttermost. In another emergency transportation will be taxed likewise. Civil aviation will be asked to supply such frequent service and to carry so many important and heavy loads in the event of hostilities that it will never be able, even if it wanted to, to become part of our military machine. We must disabuse ourselves of the idea that civil transport planes will become bombers, or that mail planes will become observation aircraft in the time of crisis—they will be too busy with their regular jobs and the extra demands made upon them. Civil aviation will aid the military indirectly by providing trained aircraft workers and shop facilities, but that is all.

Disaster awaits the civil aviator in military work. Civil pilots are unaccustomed to aerial dog-fights. They are used to gentle, long-distance handling of their ships. To expect them to fly tight formations amidst anti-aircraft shelling and in the face of enemy attackers is akin to expecting middle-aged truck drivers to compete successfully at the Indianapolis speedway. Army aviators made indifferent cross-country pilots carrying the mail. Why expect civil pilots, many of whom are thirty years or older, to perform aerial acrobatics in fights to the death with men ten years their junior?

If aviation in its relation to national defense seems absurd, our War Department goes this one better. Here we have a military establishment that is a cruel and costly joke upon the taxpayer. The War Department has fallen to pieces at the outbreak of every war in the past—experts proclaim its disintegration at the outbreak of the next war. In the first place, the War Department as it exists under the law, has no inkling of what it is supposed to do. It bends its efforts to keep its \$300,000,000 skeleton from crumpling into dust. It is unable to perform any one of its fourteen assigned missions successfully. It can not train enough reservists, it cannot support sufficient overseas garrisons, it cannot maintain a compact armed force ready for instant use, and so on down the line. Its officers are largely over-age, and the various branches over-stuffed. Because of this fact, the army suffers from a horse-and-buggy psychology. It has consistently refused to acknowledge the impact of science and invention upon the art of war. Some of its tables of organization call for more animals in an infantry division than there are mounts in a cavalry division—in a country where there is one automobile for every six persons and a gasoline pump every half mile.

The War Department regards aviation with a cold, a fishy eye. Up until January 27th, 1934, the General Staff gave no hint that aviation as such was more than an elevated platform or carrier pigeon for the other armed services. Every report of every Chief of Staff since the war

ignored the functional uses of aircraft with the superciliousness bred into the military tradition during the last 1,000 years. Even Pershing, fresh from the Western front, saw aviation as just another branch of the army—like the Dental Corps or Delousing Units.

It is useless to continue indicting the military service for lack of policy and lack of sympathy with novelty. These characteristics are common to everything connected with our national defense. Our battleships spent the last war safely anchored up the James River. Some other safe haven will undoubtedly be found for much of the new construction now on the ways, when future conflicts occur. Our 6 and 8 inch cruisers are so thinly armored that they promise to blow up like electric light bulbs in a future naval battle. This was the experience of the German and British naval experts at Jutland and Dogger Banks. Since then armor has grown thinner, armament more powerful. The British Navy spent more time fighting fire, on board its own ships, at Jutland than it spent fighting the German navy. And when gases and chemicals are rained upon surface vessels and sucked into their ventilating systems, what will be the function of these craft! Naval critics have called modern navies deaf and dumb. Except for submarines and light torpedo boats, the modern navy promises to become paralytic as well. While the modern navy with its imposing, shiny ships may still remain a marvelous symbol of a nation's manhood, common sense demands that some less expensive monument serve just as well.

The only proposal made today to bring order out of this national defense chaos has been a suggestion to place all our aeronautics under one head. By thus combining 13 different government bureaus and agencies dealing with aviation it is hoped to better our national security, lessen governmental costs and heighten efficiency. It has been wisely proposed that all military and naval aviation be co-ordinated and there are many arguments in favor of this measure. But to bring civil aviation under the same co-ordination seems illogical. The directing forces of a unified bureau of aeronautics would attempt, if there were military, to militarize all aviation. If they were civil, they would attempt to commercialize all aviation.

If ever we need a New Deal in National Defense, we need it now. For the past fifteen years all sorts of attempts have been made to create efficiency in National Defense. So far we have not even achieved efficiency within the various branches of our military and naval establishments. More legislation, more money, more men procured in favor of aeronautics will only make matters worse.

There is only one hope for the present situation. A definite military and naval policy must be established for the United States by the proper authority. When this is accomplished, departmental reorganization will be easy. A new National Defense Act must be written. The Navy must be confined to its proper sphere. Aviation must be given the function its three dimensional nature claims for it.

It would seem that a single department of national defense divided into land, sea and air sub-divisions would be the most intelligent. However, we must first decide

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by General Johnson Hagood, U. S. A.

THE people of the country are being regaled with a lot of bunk about national defense. They get it through the newspapers, the magazines, and the movies. Two things just now are in the public eye. One is to do away with the Army and Navy and to substitute a gigantic Air Force. The other is to consolidate the Army and Navy into one great Department of National Defense and then to split it three ways into land and sea and air.

These two schemes are the same; emanate from the same source. The advocates claim that they will save money to the taxpayer and for that reason they get an attentive ear.

Airplanes swooping down upon cities appeal to the imagination. For the newspapers and magazines it makes good copy, and for adult small boys it makes a good substitute for the Diamond Dick novels of their youth. So it goes over with a bang.

It is claimed that airplanes could fly across the Atlantic and destroy American cities. That cannot be done, but if so, what of it? The loss of a city does not destroy a country or bend its neck to the yoke of a foreign foe. An air raid on Wall Street might disturb the Stock Exchange, but what about the depression?

There is not an airplane in the world that could make the round trip from Berlin to Boston. The best of them must have a naval base or a landing place somewhere. But even if there were a thousand such planes, and every one of them could make a simultaneous, unresisted attack upon Boston, they would not do as much damage, in physical destruction or in loss of life, as was done to the city of Yokohama by the earthquake of September 1923—perhaps not as much as by more recent quakes that we know nothing about. Yet Japan was not wiped out. It declined the help proffered to it by the American Army and Navy in the Far East.

A 3-inch high explosive shell will do a lot of damage if it hits you but it only makes a hole in the ground 2 feet wide and 6 inches deep. They have been known to explode within 10 feet of a man's head in the front-line trenches without waking him up.

War is hell, but it is no worse now than it used to be.

Now, as to the Navy. It has been pretty well proven that airplanes cannot drop bombs on the decks of battleships. The combined motion of the ship and the plane, and the protection given to the ship by its own anti-aircraft guns, makes this an extremely difficult problem. So it has been claimed that it is not necessary for the planes to make a direct hit, that if they drop their bombs within a mile of the target, the underwater effect of the explosion (called the water hammer) would blow in the bottom of the vessel.

Out of charity we shall say that the authors of this remarkable statement did not know what they were talking about. Those of us who have had to do with the mine defense of harbors, or with the depth bombs used against submarines, know that the underwater effect of explosions follows a mathematical law, based roughly upon one divided by the fifth power of the distance.

Thus, if you put your ear to the muzzle of a shotgun,

you will get quite an effect, but if you stand a little to one side, the reaction will not be so unfavorable.

And if all the airplanes in the world should make an attack upon a lone battleship by dropping all the bombs they could carry, so as to cause a simultaneous explosion 1 mile from the ship, such an explosion, so far as its underwater effect is concerned, would not disturb a cup of tea on the wardroom table. Such an explosion on land, of course, would cause damage to buildings at quite a considerable distance.

There is a lot of big talk about airplanes.

When we entered the World War we blatantly boasted that we would put 10,000 planes over Germany; that with our genius for construction and mass production we would saturate the air with bombs and bullets; we would terrorize the men, women, and children, and send them screaming to their statesmen to demand an American peace. Thus would we overthrow oppression and make the world safe for democracy.

Passing over the slight setback the world has had in democracy, what about the airplanes?

We spent enough money on airplanes to send over not 10,000, but 100,000, and we never flew one of them over the people of Germany. We borrowed a lot from our Allies. We sent up a few so-called flaming coffins of our own. And we flew a few men about with cameras. If we dropped a single bomb, it did no material damage.

The airplane has revolutionized warfare—strategy is out in the open. Stonewall Jackson could no longer make his secret marches up and down the Shenandoah Valley. Napoleon could not creep over the Alps.

But the airplane is only an auxiliary. It stands with motor cars, torpedoes, submarines, smokeless powder, rubber, radio, machine guns, steam turbines, barbed wire, high explosive, and many other things that go to make up modern life.

Gunpowder has not replaced the bayonet. Nor has commercial aviation destroyed the railroads.

Ancient catapults threw stones into the city of Babylon. Modern catapults threw steel shells into the city of Paris.

Samson tried fire brands to the tails of foxes. The Chinese used the stink pot to gas their ancient foes. Verdun, a medieval fortress, held out to the end against every modern device and more than a million men died before its ramparts.

The Great Wall, built in the third century, B. C., comes back to its ancient purpose as a barrier between the Chinese people and the hostile hordes of the north.

All authorities agree, and have always agreed, that while there are changes in the technique of war, the fundamental principles remain the same. Hand-to-hand combat. It is there that the final decision must always lie.

The German submarine destroyed vast quantities of unarmed commercial shipping, but they did not destroy an American troop ship. The American Navy delivered 2,000,000 men in Europe and it could only be by a navy greater than ours that any foreign foe could land its troops in America.

The air bombardment of London, Paris, and Shanghai

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Wohlforth, *Cont'd*

what we want to do about national defense and then do it, without regard to tradition, custom or prejudice.

It is apparent that the next step is the formation of a special select committee to recommend a broad national defense policy for our government. To try more patch-work upon the crazy-quilt of our national defense set-up today is to court failure.

by Jeannette Rankin

Legislative Secretary, National Council
for Prevention of War

THE PROOF of incompetence and rivalry for power in the Army and Navy brought out in the hearings on measures to establish a Federal Department of Defence constitute the best argument for such a department. Such a move would necessitate the explicit repudiation of the aggressive policy which gave us our so-called National Defense Act, and the immediate reorganization of our armed forces on strictly defensive lines. That this reorganization will serve the ends of both economy and efficiency appears from the criticisms of our present system which have been made within the army itself.

General Johnson Hagood, noted for his success both in military administration and in active service, told the House Committee on Military Affairs that the National Defense Act "stands today like a great machine with many of its essential parts missing." Of the administrative provisions of the act, General Hagood said: "The War Department and the staff departments generally control the expenditure of millions in time of peace and billions in time of war, yet this organization is so complicated that no one can explain it, much less work it under stress of war. . . . The war department contains three groups of agencies all covering the same subject and each trying to outdo the others in the assumption of responsibility and in the exercise of authority."

When the National Defense Act was framed, the professional militarists sought to obtain a standing army of a half million men and universal military service, to create a potential reserve of enormous strength. Prevented by the common sense of the country from realizing this ideal, the proponents of aggression were still dominated by the fixed idea that the United States must be continually ready to mobilize an expeditionary army of four million men, at the drop of a hat. This hallucination obtruded itself even into their theories of national defense, where they dreamed of an army of a million men to repel large invading forces; and forgot that adequate coast defenses backed by a small efficient mobile force would

prevent invasion. Instead of putting a padlock on the barn door, they tried to decorate the interior with a hodge podge of expensive burglar traps which they now hope may work, tho they scarcely appear to expect it.

Denied the formidable conscript army of their heart's desire, the anxious army chiefs conceived the idea that every male who could be squeezed into any sort of uniform might be made to look like a real soldier if furnished with a sufficiently expensive scenic background. Millions of dollars annually are accordingly lavished upon stage properties for the National Guard, the Reserve Officers Training Corps, and the Citizens' Military Training Camps.

A benevolent government now supplies the National Guard with the arms and equipment that members of the militia supplied for themselves in the days when the government and its citizens were both poorer. Having supplied the properties, the government hires caretakers to guard and burnish them—a service costing \$318,000 annually in one corps area alone. In addition the National Guard is opulently outfitted with motor equipment, tho they might be expected to hire what they needed for training purposes on the infrequent occasions when they need it. Until late in 1933 they were also supplied with thousands of saddle horses, reported to be suffering from lack of exercises, but apparently held in readiness in case they should be needed in the trenches. In spite of all this the National Guard remains primarily a state force, seldom called upon for any service, and probably in need of almost as much training as the rest of the population in the event of mobilization for war.

Millions annually are poured over the R.O.T.C. and C.M.T.C. both of which institutions were admitted by General Summerall, Chief of Staff in 1930, to be quite inadequate as a practicable reserve force. Here again, a generous war department assumes the expense of maintaining R.O.T.C. equipment, amounting in one corps area in 1932 to \$161,000. The result of fostering the R.O.T.C. has been to produce an army of 100,000 officers and no privates, which, according to General Hagood is "doomed to failure." The General points out that as the world war veterans pass out of the picture, their places are taken by R.O.T.C. and C.M.T.C. boys who will "have some theoretical home reading on military subjects, and 10 days in camp in sight of soldiers about once every five years. To say that such men can command regiments, brigades and divisions is a travesty upon the military profession. To say that they are the best material available is untrue, because we have 12,000 regular army officers, enough to fill all the higher grades, and supported by the people at a cost of \$53,000,000 a year." Can it be that the sole object of the R.O.T.C. and C.M.T.C. is to preserve militaristic feeling in a few boys? Is this achievement worth millions to anyone but the munition makers?

Even in the organization of the regular army, common sense and efficiency have been sacrificed to the love of stage effect and the belief that complexity must be a virtue in itself. "There should be a general re-codification," says General Hagood, "of the laws and regulations governing the army. The purpose should be to give us some-

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Hagood, Cont'd

brought no military advantage. It just made the people mad.

Since the beginning of time hostile armies have had the power to annihilate the people. Wholesale massacres have taken place. But even among savages there is a code of ethics. There is honor among thieves, and at the water hole wild beasts declare a truce.

Retaliation is the great weapon that all nations fear, and there is no use for America to get scared at the thought of airplanes sowing poison, disease germs, and death.

And now we come to the question of combining the Army and the Navy into one great Department of National Defense. As already pointed out, this is just an excuse to create a situation favorable to the formation of an independent air force, the necessity for which is nil.

The Army and the Navy come together only at the coast line. The Navy uses the Army rifle and there is cooperation in the manufacture of big guns and ammunition. In my twenty-odd years of service in the coast defenses, and in all the experience of history, I can find no instance in which anything more is needed than is now provided by law. The introduction of airplanes has not changed this in any material fashion.

The establishment of another big bureau in Washington is not needed. So far as the Army is concerned, we have too many bureaus already and we could spare six or eight of them with advantage to the national defense and to the joy of the taxpayer. There is no duplication between the Army and the Navy. But there is a duplication within the Army and it is to be hoped that the President, with his extraordinary power, will be able to accomplish a consolidation and a simplification within the Army itself that could not have been accomplished with the complicated machinery set up by Congress.

The Regular Army has too many overlapping agencies. We are overstaffed. I have twice as many staff officers, clerks, and orderlies as I need, but I cannot get rid of them under the existing set-up.

Our system of administration and supply is so complicated and involved that it would collapse at the outbreak of the next war, just as it has collapsed at the outbreak of every war in the past.

We are tied hand and foot with red tape, borne down with unnecessary paper work, and laboring under a training system that could not be comprehended by emergency officers in time of war. I doubt very much if there be a general in the Army, or an officer of the General Staff, who has read the American training regulations—certainly not one who could pass an examination upon them.

Pershing, March, Baker, Foch, and Clemenceau agreed that America wasted time in useless training that kept her troops out of trenches months and months after the time when they should have been there. But these great authorities do not agree as to where to fix the blame.

I fix the blame on the fact that now and for the past 50 years we have been using a training system based upon a 3-year Regular Army soldier, when we should have had a system based upon a 10-day drafted replacement.

We cannot give the soldier experience. That comes with time and opportunity. But within 10 days from the moment of his induction into the military service we can give the private soldier all the training in the technique of his arm that is necessary for him to begin his work in the line of battle. He will not be a veteran soldier. He may not be able to compete with a Follies girl in making a snappy salute, but he will at least be able to shoot as well as a bootleg gangster.

We spend too much money on the National Guard. Taking the major figures for a battery of field artillery in a small-sized town in Kansas, we find that one fourth goes to the pay of the guard and the other three fourths goes to the pay of the Regular Army instructors, the caretakers of Federal property, and the feed and care of horses.

It is not likely that the present arms or equipment of the National Guard will ever be used in war. They will all be obsolete by that time. If they be suitable for ordinary drill and camp, if they be sufficient for the use of the State, then it is not necessary to give them a beauty treatment once a week. Brass polish is not going to help much with a worn out war-time truck.

The same can be said of the R.O.T.C., which is the key to national defense.

A successful young business man was in my office yesterday. He was a graduate of Culver Military Academy and Yale. He had a certificate that qualified him to be a corporal in a case of war. If that man is not better qualified to be an officer than the average of what we have had in past wars, then who is?

We have in this country nearly 400,000 college graduates under 35 years of age, all of whom have had at least two years' military training under Federal supervision. But under our present R.O.T.C. system only 10 per cent of these men are qualified as officers. The rest of them are trained and rated as enlisted men. The Adjutant General of Australia told me 30 years ago that we had the best military schools in the world, and more than all the rest of the world together, but that they were not properly incorporated into our military system. We have made some advance in 30 years. But we are still far from the goal.

The Officers' Reserve Corps is a wonderful institution as long as it is dominated by World War veterans. But these veterans will pass out, and the laws and regulations governing that institution, as well as the R.O.T.C., should be modified to meet that inevitable situation.

Summing it up, and speaking only of the Army; The present system of national defense is all right. It is the best system we ever had. It is based primarily upon the genius of the American people, and it is headed up in Washington by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, one of the ablest men that ever headed the Army in peace or war. But like every other Department of the Government it is top-heavy and extravagant. It needs close trimming to make it fit the pocketbook of the man without a job.

It takes 300 million dollars to run the Army under its present organization. We can get a better organization for less.

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Rankin, *Cont'd*

thing in time of peace that could be expanded and operated by emergency officers in time of war. . . . We should visualize the enormous cost of war, and develop men and methods to reduce it to a minimum. But even our peace-time expenses could be reduced by codification. . . . Ninety per cent of the present regulations, orders and correspondence could be abolished with improvement to the service."

A few of the decorative features of the army which would never be missed are:

The cavalry: picturesque, but too slow for modern war.

Polo ponies for officers: cost almost a million a year until recently. Still retained in some places.

Mounted organizations such as pack trains, headquarters outfits, ambulances, etc. Would have to be motorized immediately on the outbreak of war. Principally useful for practise in wrangling mules.

Quantities of motor transportation held by each unit of the army, as if the country were not overrun with motors which could be requisitioned when the need arose. Supplies of this and of numerous other types, held in garages for warehouses become obsolete before they are used.

Philippine garrison of about 5,000 white and 6,000 Philippine troops maintained at a cost of between 10 and 20 million dollars annually for the last 30 years. According to Generals Wood, Summerall, O'Ryan and Hagood, this garrison could not hold the islands at all. General Wood stated that 250,000 men would not be enough to hold them if the U. S. did not control the Pacific. General Hagood suggests that the white force could hold Corregidor. The Philippine Scouts should, in his opinion, be disbanded.

Signal corps maintained as a separate division though it does nothing not done by other branches of the service. With engineers, telegraphers, etc. now available in the civil population at need, the signal corps has become "one of the expensive luxuries that the army cannot afford to maintain in time of peace."

Chemical warfare maintained expensively as a separate department to do what could be done equally well by the Ordnance Department, and was done by them in the war.

Inspector General's department maintained at Washington with nothing to do, since inspection is necessarily carried on by local authorities.

Many "Chiefs" kept in Washington for no purpose but to see that one does not get more for his branch of the service than the other.

To crown the whole structure, men trained and experienced in administrative subordinated in administration to men taken from active service who neither like nor understand administrative work.

Contemplating all of this curious machinery, the civilian is not surprised to learn that the military intellect is as much baffled by it as is his own.

One sovereign remedy is clearly indicated for this luxury of futile extravagance. The remedy of immediate return to the principle of military organization for defense only—the principle clearly in the minds of the

framers of our Constitution, and repeatedly enunciated in past years, notably in the Kellogg pacts and in the recent pronouncements of President Roosevelt. For this return to sanity, we must definitely abandon every mode of thought of the aggressive viewpoint. We must put in control of the Army, Navy and Air forces men who are able to use competent administrative common sense in their reorganization and coordination solely for purposes of defense. The suggestion of uniting these forces under one administrative head in a federal Department of Defense merits consideration.

Conference of Peace Societies

WE HAVE appreciated the continuing effort of our Government to achieve the greatest possible measure of world disarmament at the Geneva Conference, the proclamation of the "good neighbor" policy as our national policy, and its effective and successful expression through Secretary Hull at Montevideo improving notably our relations with the Latin American States. We strongly support President Roosevelt's proposal for universal non-aggression pacts. We welcome the recent exchange of notes with the Japanese Government as of marked importance.

At the same time, we cannot but view with grave concern the inadequacy of the efforts our Government is putting forth for the maintenance of peace in comparison with its tremendous and competitive expenditures in preparation for war.

Preparation for war has never brought peace nor security to any nation. As we read history it appears that we were drawn into the World War by our trade, primarily in munitions, with the warring States, and not through any lack of preparedness nor through any international commitments, unless it were the debts which the allied nations owed us for munitions. We fear that if another great war should break out either in Europe or in Asia, unless conditions are changed fundamentally, history would repeat itself.

Accordingly, we urge upon our Government that the care that has been given to the formulation of a program of domestic economic recovery be now given to formulating a more adequate foreign policy. We believe that the permanent success of our domestic policy hangs upon world recovery; and world recovery requires first of all world stability.

We support heartily President Roosevelt's policy of the "good neighbor" and we believe that it should be developed towards all nations. If the peace of the world breaks down, and if the United States should drift into another great and futile war, not only will the painful efforts now being made to improve the condition of the "forgotten man" be undone but the destruction of millions of our

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Hagood, Cont'd

Every institution in the country has had to reorganize along more economic lines. The Army should do the same.

Pinching off a dollar here and there will do no good. We must correct the defects that have been growing for 50 years.—*Extracts, see 5, p. 128.*

The Morrow Aircraft Board

ANY consideration of the air policy of the United States, especially as regards the military air strength which we should develop, should be based on a careful consideration of—

- (1) The general military policy of the United States,
- (2) The air strength of those foreign States which, having in view our geographical position, could menace our security.

Our naval strength is now determined by international agreement. So far as naval warfare is concerned, the strengths of the air arms of the naval forces of world powers will presumably be in close relation to the naval strengths authorized under the convention regarding the limitation of armaments. Here our obvious general policy should be to maintain our naval aviation in due relation to the fleet.

Our national policy calls for the establishment of the air strength of our Army primarily as an agency of defense. Protected, as the United States is, by broad oceans from possible enemies, the evidence submitted in our hearings gives complete ground for the conclusion that there is no present reason for apprehension of any invasion from overseas directly by way of the air; nor indeed is there any apparent probability of such an invasion in any future which can be foreseen.

It furthermore appears that in order to place any considerable enemy air force in a position for effective operation against our cities, ground armies, or military positions, it would be necessary to transport such force by water-borne shipping—airplane carriers and cargo ships—and establish a land base from which such operations could be carried on. This could not be effected so long as our fleet is undefeated on the sea.

A careful study by the Army and Navy high commands of the factors entering into the question of the air strength, should indicate the total strength needed in order to insure the proper measure of national security, while at the same time holding a consistent relation to our traditional policy of maintaining armed forces for defense rather than for aggression, and to the need of wise economy in all demands on the public purse.

Due to the special prominence which it has received through newspaper publicity and otherwise, it seems well to supplement the reference in the preceding question regarding our danger from overseas attack by way of the

air, by some more specific discussion of the following question:

Is the United States in danger by air attack from any potential enemy of menacing strength?

Our answer to this question is no.

This conclusion is based on the facts as they now are. The mere fact of the distance covered in flights is, no criterion of the ability of airplanes to make transoceanic flights of equal distance under war conditions and with an effective military load. Although there is some variance in the testimony on this point it seems to be the consensus of expert opinion that the effective radius of flight for bombing operations is at present between 200 and 300 miles. By effective radius of flight of a bombing airplane is meant the distance from point of departure to an objective which this airplane could bomb and then return to its starting point. This distance, for large bombing operations, includes allowance for possible adverse weather conditions, for the capacity of personnel as contrasted with the capacity of the airplane itself, for some reduction in speed and range in the case of a squadron as compared with a single plane, and for time lost over the objective. All of this results in a very considerable reduction in radius for effective operation as compared with that which might be based on a single trial flight under favorable conditions. With the advance in the art it is to be expected that there will be substantial advance in the range and capacity of bombing airplanes; but, having in view present practical limitations, it does not appear that there is any ground for anticipation of such development to a point which would constitute a direct menace to the United States in any future which scientific thought can now foresee.

The fear of such an attack is without reason.

In the foregoing we are speaking of an attack upon the continental United States, and are ignoring an attack from Mexico or Canada. To create a defense system based upon a hypothetical air attack from Canada, Mexico, or any other of our near neighbors would be wholly unreasonable. For a century we have, under treaty, left the Great Lakes unguarded by a naval force; by mutual consent the long Canadian frontier is free from armament on either side. The result has justified such a course.

Should there be a department of national defense under which should be grouped all the military defensive organizations of the Government?

We have considered a separate department of the air under which it has been proposed there should be grouped both military and civilian aviation activities. Such a proposition we have disapproved for the reason that civilian and military activities should, in our opinion, be kept separate. The present question involves different considerations. It is, in fact, largely a question of administrative machinery. Entirely apart from the problems that have been raised by the new and enlarged uses of military aviation, the question has been often before considered of uniting the Army and the Navy under a Secretary of National Defense. President Harding made such a proposal to Congress, but so far as we have been able to discover, this proposal did not meet with favor

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Peace Societies, *Cont'd*

boys and the agony and want of years of strife and convulsion will be followed by national bankruptcy, another world depression, another pension roll, and probably the literal downfall of our civilization as we know it, with its ideals and particularly its liberties.

We submit the following proposals to which our organizations have given general support either by specific action or by approval of the basic principles involved:

We unite in believing that our Government should ratify immediately the World Court Protocols.

We believe that the United States should now state the terms on which it would be willing to join the League of Nations—revision of the Covenant of which is receiving world-wide consideration. Russia seems to be contemplating membership. We believe that if the United States were to join with Russia in making the reconstituted League of Nations a world League, no single event would do so much to stabilize the world and to further economic recovery everywhere. As expressing the mature judgment of a member of our group in whom we place great confidence, we append to this letter a memorandum by Professor James T. Shotwell on the possibilities of revision of the League of Nations Covenant.

We ask the immediate passage by Congress of the arms embargo resolution.

We unite further in asking public support to the investigation of the manufacture of arms and munitions, believing as we do that the people of the United States want to know who foment war hysteria. We respectfully submit that the logical next step in the interest of the common man should be official encouragement of this proposed investigation.

We urge all necessary steps to bring about the successful achievement of a disarmament treaty which shall include an agreement for international supervision of all aviation and progressive reduction of military air forces.

As representatives of organizations which have taken definite action opposing the Vinson Bill or have indicated their general commitment to the policy of arms reduction and are therefore on principle opposed to all expansion in armaments, we wish to express our regret that the passage of the Vinson Bill is forcing the pace in Naval building. Despite the fact that this is within the limits of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, it makes more difficult, we believe, the task of our government in limiting and reducing armaments. We respectfully suggest that, with more than fifty naval vessels now actually under construction in a time when national resources are desperately needed for relief, education and housing, refusal of the sanction further appropriations for naval construction until after the 1935 Conference.

We believe that the State Department is our first line of defense and consequently deserves larger support than it now has from public funds. We therefore urge that everything possible be done to secure larger appropriations for the Department of State so that it may carry out more effectively the peace program which the people of the United States desire.

The overwhelming majority of the peoples of the world want peace. We recognize no enemy so dangerous as war. We therefore look with confidence for action which shall express the general American will to peace and abhorrence of war in a more adequate and comprehensive program along the lines indicated.—*Extracts, see 7, p. 128.*

Morrow, Cont'd

either in Congress or in the Army and the Navy.

The argument in favor of such a course has been and is that there is now overlapping of the Army and Navy. There is some strength in the argument. Such consolidation might secure more cooperative training in times of peace and perhaps some economies in buying. The amount of overlapping is, however, less than is generally assumed. Moreover, an element of competition in certain matters has its advantages.

The argument against such a course is the added complexity in organization which would inevitably result. The Army and Navy organizations urge with force that each of them is entitled to a member of the Cabinet in order that its special views may be properly presented to the President and to the Congress. If the two present service organizations were consolidated under a single secretary it would at once become necessary to create a super general staff. No secretary of national defense could operate the two organizations without subsecretaries and technical advisers. This super general staff, which would be in addition to the present service staffs, would necessarily comprise Army and Navy advisers who had been educated not only in their own particular schools but who would be required to have taken courses in the schools of the service to which they did not belong. It is difficult to see how any such super-organization would make for economy in time of peace or for efficiency in time of war.

During a war period the President, as the Commander in Chief of both services, must act as the director of national defense. President Lincoln in the Civil War and President Wilson in the World War had to assume such a position. Moreover, when the President assumes such a position the necessity of linking the defensive agencies of the Government does not stop with the Army and the Navy. The Council of National Defense, which during the World War was organized to coordinate our industries and resources, included the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. There are thus swept into the actual department of na-

tional defense, acting under the President, many other organizations whose activities during peace time have nothing directly to do with defense. The memory of the Great War is so recent that we hardly need call attention to the fact that railroads, coal supply, agricultural activities, important war industries, dealings with labor, all by special legislation had to be brought into coordination with the work of the Army and the Navy.

We do not recommend a Department of National Defense, either as comprising the Army and the Navy or as comprising three coordinate departments of Army, Navy, and Air. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages.

Should there be formed a separate department for air, coordinate with the present Departments of War and Navy?

Our answer is no.

The quoted opinion of General Pershing and the direct testimony of General Summerall, General Hines, and General Ely, of Admiral Sims, Admiral Eberle, Admiral Robinson, Admiral Coontz, and Admiral Hughes stressed the need of the Army and of the Navy for their own air services. Modern military and naval operations can not be effectively conducted without such services acting as integral parts of a single command. Moreover, the training of these air services that are to act with the Army and with the Navy must be under the continuous direction and control of the command which is ultimately to use them. In these conclusions and principles we concur. The question left to consider is whether the country has need of a separate independent air force in addition to the air power required for use with the Army and the Navy. We do not consider that air power, as an arm of the national defense, has yet demonstrated its value—certainly not in a country situated as ours—for independent operations of such a character as to justify the organization of a separate department. We believe that such independent missions as it is capable of can be better carried out under the high command of the Army or Navy, as the case may be.—*Extracts, see 6, p. 128.*

How the U. S. Navy Stands Today

by Hon. Frederick Hale,

U. S. Senator, Maine, Republican

SINCE the Washington treaty in 1922, we have sought, by not building up our Navy, to influence other countries not to build up theirs. Our example has not been followed.

While up to two years ago we had built but very few ships since 1922, all of the other great naval powers had materially improved their naval armament during the same time by adding new ships and by replacing worn-out ships with modern up-to-date vessels.

Battleships, under the Washington and London treaties, we may not build or replace.

Aircraft carriers and cruisers, both eight-inch gun and six-inch gun, we have very well provided for through the annual appropriations and through the money obtained from the public works appropriation, but in destroyers and submarines we are far below our treaty allowance.

At the close of the war we found ourselves, due to the demands of our allies for destroyer protection against submarines, with a very great number of destroyers either built or contracted for before or during the war, and we still have some 280 of these old vessels in our possession.

This year the newest of these destroyers becomes over age under the terms of the London Treaty. There is still left considerable usefulness in these old destroyers, but with their smaller guns, lesser cruising radius, and inferior seagoing efficiency in rough weather, they are in no way to be compared with the destroyer of these later days.

Until two years ago no new destroyers had been laid down since the Washington Treaty in 1922. Within the past two years 32 modern destroyers have been contracted for and eight have already been laid down. Our treaty quota is about 90 destroyers.

In submarines, we have 80 vessels, but of these, counting those now in process of construction, only 24 will be under age at the close of 1936, when by treaty agreement we must destroy any surplus tonnage that we have over and above the 50,700 tons allowed under the London Treaty. This will mean that we must destroy before the close of the year 1936, 39 of our older submarines.

In the same way in the destroyer class, where our treaty quota is 150,000 tons, we shall, under the London Treaty agreement, have to destroy some 160 of the old destroyers.

Unless additional ships, therefore, are built, our Navy on December 31, 1936, will consist of the following ships, built and building:

Capital ships, 15, of 455,400 tons; seven over age.

Seven of these ships will be over age, but as the same will apply to the capital ship quota of the other powers, that is not a serious defect.

Aircraft carriers, six of 131,300 tons.

Cruisers "A," 18, of 172,650 tons (including one provided for in the appropriation bill which has recently passed the Senate).

Cruisers "B," 17, of 140,500 tons (including three provided for in the appropriation bill which has recently passed the Senate).

Destroyers, 123, of 150,000 tons; 32 new destroyers, of 50,800 tons; 91 old destroyers, of 99,200 tons.

Submarines, 24, of 32,270 tons, new and not over age; 25, of 20,430 tons, over age.

So, except for the ships now building, which will come into commission before the close of the year 1936, we shall at that time, under the treaty requirements, scrap all tonnage in all classes of ships over and above our treaty quotas, be in a far weaker condition in case of hostilities than we are at the present time.

We might take care of our lack of modern destroyers at the present time, should hostilities occur, with our overabundance of old destroyers which still have some fighting value, but we shall not have these vessels after 1936.

In the same way we might utilize our overabundance of old submarines but, as in the case of destroyers, not after the close of the year 1936.

Our Navy, while it will be well provided with battleships, airplane carriers, and cruisers, will be deplorably weak in destroyers and submarines, both integral and necessary parts of the fleet, and we shall be very much in the position of a man who has a new, expensive, high-power automobile with two weak tires on the front wheels.

We have got to have new ships if we are to keep our Navy. No navy lasts forever. Under the terms agreed upon in the London treaty, aircraft carriers and cruisers are allotted an under-age life of 20 years, destroyers of 16 years (except those laid down before 1920), submarines 13 years.

During these terms, these ships unless destroyed may not be replaced. Granting an average life of 20 years, and the average would be very considerably less than that, a fleet must in its entirety be replaced in 20 years if it is to be kept up to full treaty strength.

The cost of replacement of an entire treaty navy, based on the cost per ton of each class of ship, taking the figures that were in existence before we went off the gold standard, would be \$1,747,000,000 or an annual replacement cost of ninety-six-odd million dollars.

Leaving out the battleships, which under the terms of the Washington and London treaties we cannot replace, the annual cost of replacement of so much of our navy as would constitute a treaty navy would be sixty-eight-and-one-half-odd million dollars. Our annual expendi-

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Provisions of the Vinson Navy Bill

by Hon. Carl Vinson,

U. S. Representative, Georgia, Democrat

Chairman, House Committee on Naval Affairs

THE bill, H. R. 6604, introduced by me seeks to accomplish three objectives: First, the measure establishes the strength of the United States Navy in respect of the categories of ships that are limited by international agreement; second, it authorized the President to undertake the construction of such ships as are required to maintain the Navy in under-age units at the strength prescribed by treaty; third, it authorized the appropriations necessary for such buildings.

To bring the Navy up to treaty strength in under-age ships will require the construction of 102 new ships to take the place of obsolete ones. These 102 new ships will consist of 65 destroyers, 1 airplane carrier, 30 submarines, and 6 cruisers.

The measure leaves absolutely in the hands of the President the decision as to when he shall request appropriations for the commencement of the various units.

When this bill is boiled down to its last analysis, it is simply an authorization for replacement of obsolete ships, plus a definite statement that it is the policy of the United States to maintain the Navy at whatever limits may be established by international agreement.

The Washington and London treaties permit the United States to have a total of 1,186,000 tons distributed through the various categories. On December 31, 1933, we actually had 372 ships, aggregating 1,038,660 tons, but of this number 288 ships which add up to 330,110 tons were over-age, leaving us but 84 under-age ships of a tonnage of 708,550.

To build the ships that we now need to bring us up to treaty strength in under-age ships will involve an expenditure of approximately \$380,000,000. Of course, this is an estimate which may have to be revised because of uncertainties as to future costs of labor and material. If commenced in the fiscal year 1935, the program would require from 7 to 8 years for completion.

The greatest source of weakness of the United States on the sea arises from the lack of a definite policy as to the building and maintenance of the Navy. For many

years we have affirmed our intention "to maintain the Navy in sufficient strength to support the national policies and commerce and to guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States." The fact remains, however, that we have never had such a Navy, and unless this bill is enacted into a law we never will have one. The country and Congress should thoroughly understand that the policies of the Government cannot be maintained and supported with obsolete ships. For the first time in the history of this country we are now trying to provide a logical, orderly plan for the maintenance of the Navy at a level which is sufficient to provide against emergencies. This measure will give no offense and involve no threat to any foreign power and will require the least possible burden on our taxpayers.

The navies of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan are now limited by treaty to a definite maximum strength in each of the categories into which combatant ships are divided. The Treaty of Washington, 1922, fixed limits to the permissible strength in capital ships and aircraft carriers. The Treaty of London, 1930, prescribed limits for all remaining categories, namely cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Treaty of Washington is to continue in effect until denounced by one of the signatories. The Treaty of London will expire on December 31, 1936.

The United States believes whole-heartedly in limitation of armaments, and we have contributed very greatly to the consummation of that ideal. At the Washington conference we took the unprecedented course of surrendering voluntarily the naval supremacy which we then possessed. We agreed to scrap 11 of the most powerful battleships and battle cruisers which have ever been designed. In addition we took out of the line and agreed to scrap 20 complete battleships. Furthermore, we agreed not to increase the strength of our naval bases or fortifications in the Pacific except on the coasts of the United States, Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, and the Canal Zone, and not to establish new bases or fortifications in insular possessions which we then held or might acquire. In making this sacrifice we announced to the world that we were willing to forego supremacy and that we would be content with strength equal to that of Great Britain but measurably greater than that of any other power. No other nation on earth has made a contribution which can approach that of the United States. If limitation is to be an influence for the furtherance of peace rather than a factor which produces additional uncertainty and danger, all of the naval powers must act similarly. So long as a situation continues as at present, with one nation built right up to the limit in all categories, whereas another is far short of her limits, the cause of peace is gravely jeopardized.

Should the U. S. Navy be Built Up to Treaty Strength?

PRO

Arguments Favoring

IN ORDER fully to understand the situation in which our Navy stands today, why it is limited, and what these limitations are, it is necessary to know why the treaties for naval limitations were made and what they sought to accomplish.

The Treaty of Peace that brought the World War to a close left many international difficulties unsolved, particularly in the Pacific and Far East. To solve the grave problem that beset the world and to stop the wasteful production of unnecessary armament a series of treaties, resolutions and declarations was negotiated; the Washington (1922) and London (1930). Treaties for the limitation of naval armaments being only two of a large number which included the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty (1922) and, later, the Kellogg Peace Pact (1928). All of these treaties, resolutions and formal declarations must be considered as a whole closely and inextricably associated. Each one contributes its part in combination with the others toward establishing among all nations a feeling of peaceful security, in place of suspicion and apprehension, accompanied by intensive competitive preparations for war.

In order to establish a balance of armaments among the various powers, calculated to produce this sense of security and to ensure peace, the duly appointed delegates of the nations met in Conference, first in Washington and later in London, and decided what ratios of Naval strength should be possessed by each, to bring about the desired result. In the ratification of the Washington and London treaties, the nations concerned accepted these ratios together with the limitations placed upon each type of ship.

As it is incumbent upon each signatory Government not to exceed the limitations fixed by treaty, so is it, in my opinion, an implied obligation to maintain its Navy at the full treaty strength. For if any Government permits its Naval strength to fall below that level, the balance of the whole peace and security structure is deranged.

As to the reductions that were made and the limitations fixed, the delegates at the arms limitation conferences considered they had reduced to the lowest point consistent with National safety and the safety of the world. History has shown that no nation can afford to permit its national defense to drop to the point where it cannot protect itself against attack. This same principle applies to the leading nations of the world acting in concert, as they did in signing the naval limitation treaties, for the protection of general world peace. Wipe out the leading navies of the world and you open the way for aggressive nations to prey upon

by Admiral
William H. Standley,
U. S. N.

Chief of Naval Operations

weaker nations.

Building a navy purely for offense and building a navy purely for defense are two different matters. We are simply seeking to build and maintain a navy for defense, but we insist that our defensive navy should be efficient, not only as to the number of ships and men required, but also as to the quality and effectiveness of those ships and men.

It can be said, without fear of contradiction, that the United States has done everything within its power to bring about further reduction of armaments. We have been consistent advocates of disarmament by practical example. We have reduced in the hope that others would follow our example, but that hope has not been realized. Instead, today, we find the world more of an armed camp than ever before, spending roughly five billion dollars a year on armaments, with nearly six million men in the military services of the signers of the Kellogg Peace Pact, while widespread political and economic turmoil menace the peace of the world. The years of deliberation at Geneva since the London Conference have produced no agreement that would tend to check the growing threat to peace and security.

Under present conditions, I firmly believe every right thinking American will hold it our sacred duty, as well as our right, to build the Navy up to full treaty strength, not only for our own protection but for the preservation of world peace as well.

What is the strength of our Navy as set by treaty? The Washington Treaty eliminated the factor of competition in regard to capital ships and aircraft carriers. The limits set were at the ratio of 5-5-3 for the United States, the British Empire and Japan respectively, and 1.67 for France and Italy. As a result of this treaty the United States, the British Empire and Japan scrapped a large number of battleships and battle cruisers; the United States making altogether the heaviest sacrifice in new tonnage.

The Treaty of London, which was ratified by the United States, the British Empire and Japan, but not by France and Italy, further reduced the number and total tonnage of capital ships and also applied maximum limitations of total tonnage to cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The treaty, however, left other types such as torpedo boats, sloops, auxiliaries, and coastal motor boats as well as aircraft, open to unlimited construction. This treaty comprises a maze of technical complexities somewhat bewildering to the uninitiated. The ratio of 5-5-3 was retained for capital ships and aircraft carriers, but we acceded to an increased ratio in cruisers for both Japan and the British Empire. Japan obtained also an increased ratio in destroyers and full

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Should the U. S. Navy be Built Up to Treaty Strength?

Arguments Opposing

IF THE Vinson bill is not a gesture, and I have no reason to believe that it is, it will do more, in my judgment, to promote suspicion, ill will, and discord than anything we possibly could do, and undo much of the efforts of sincere and honest statesmen, not the representatives of selfish interests, extending over a number of years to promote world peace and curtail armaments.

I do not know who conceived this measure, but I do not know of anything we could possibly do that would better please the selfish commercial interests who live by the profits derived from material supplied to the Military and naval establishments.

What a splendid atmosphere we are building for our emissaries to the next conference on the limitation of naval armament, which meets a year hence!

In the naval appropriation bill passed by the House at this session every bit of ship construction that may be proceeded with at this time was provided for in the categories in which we are short. Bear that in mind.

In addition we are asked to approve a bill to construct replacements for aging destroyers at a cost of \$250,381,600. The committee report on this bill indicates that, in addition to these destroyers, other construction for which the bill provides will bring the total expenditure to \$380,329,250. Now, do not be fooled by that. This bill has been very adroitly phrased. It contains a very interesting proviso, under which the President, subject to an appropriation therefor, would be empowered to replace, after the calendar year 1936, if the existing treaties be not continued, 15 battleships of 525,000 tons gross. Note that the first section of the bill permanently establishes the composition of the United States Navy in accordance with the limits prescribed in existing treaties for combatant vessels of the several categories.

Think of it! We are asked to approve the construction of 15 capital ships of 35,000 tons average that may be laid down after January 1, 1936. Fifteen great big lumbering hulks that cost in the neighborhood of \$40,000,000 apiece to build, which, in the event of a war, with a big naval power, would, as Admiral Sims, I believe, it was, said, would "better be tied up somewhere up the Mississippi out of harm's way."

So, we are not providing for the expenditure of \$380,000,000. We are, in truth, asked to authorize an expenditure over a period of years of a sum more nearly in the neighborhood of \$1,000,000,000. Possibly this is an understatement.

The Navy appropriation bill, in conjunction with expenditures from N.R.A. funds, will create a cash Treasury demand during the fiscal year 1935 of \$478,000,000. This bill proposes to add to the figure, that is, just for

by

Hon. Ross A. Collins

U. S. Representative, Miss.,
Democrat

next year alone—\$23,180,000. Then, according to press reports, this same House naval affairs committee which brought in the Vinson bill is about to bring in another increasing the Navy's airplane strength from 1,000 to 2,184, and which looks to a further expenditure on that account, during 1935, of not less than \$4,500,000. In other words, the plans thus far look to a naval expenditure next year in excess of \$500,000,000.

It has been stated that a treaty Navy would require something like 115,000 men. A treaty Navy with 115,000 men, according to Navy experts, would cost annually pretty close to \$525,000,000.

In view of our large interest-bearing debt that is piling up, I just do not see how we are going to pay the annual interest charges, to say nothing of retiring any part of the debt, support defense establishments of any such proportions as here advocated, and have anything left for other Federal activities, without so burdening the people with taxation as to cause a general revolt.

We have got to look to the future, in my judgment. It is all very nice to applaud speeches of this fellow or that fellow who waves the flag and would lead you to believe that he is more patriotic than some other fellow who believes in reckoning the cost. But, however distasteful it may be to be reminded of costs, the American people sooner or later have got to pay for any extravagances in which Congress may indulge.

We are not out of the depression yet by a long shot. No one knows how long and to what extent the Federal Government may be required to continue to give Federal aid to relieve distress. I personally feel that the end would be nearer if the money some seem to be so anxious to spend upon the Army and Navy were spent directly in our districts in building modern schoolhouses, providing small libraries in rural communities, and in similar directions where local unemployment would be immediately and directly benefited and from which local communities would derive lasting good.

The farmer is in distress—the cotton grower, the wheat grower, the stock raiser. Four million men have been given temporary work out of Federal funds in lieu of a dole. Three hundred thousand unemployed young men are scattered among camps maintained by the Government all over the land, and thousands upon thousands are working on Public Works projects costing a sum which cannot possibly be continued. Until we can see such demands as these disappearing, and, if they do not disappear, a way evolved to continue Federal support, by no vote of mine nor, shall our Government engage in throwing away vast sums needlessly upon alleged military weapons whose merit is negligible and whose need does not exist.

C O N

How the U. S. Navy Stands Today

Continued from page 118

tures for this purpose in the ten years following the Washington treaty has been less than \$40,000,000, or more than \$26,000,000 a year below what the cost of replacement of a treaty navy would be.

Had the other powers kept on with their old ships and not replaced them when they became over age, we could well do the same thing and still maintain our relative strength; but as it happens Japan will wind up the year 1936 within some 3,000 tons—or less than one-half the tonnage of one small cruiser—of her maximum allowance of modern, up-to-date ships; and Great Britain, though unless she speeds up her building program she will not be up fully to her treaty quota by 1936, will be far better off than we are and with more than twice as many modern destroyers as ours and with half again as many modern submarines; her shortage in under-age ships will not fall almost entirely on two classes of necessary ships, as does our own.

If we are to maintain our relative strength, we have got to spend money on our navy.

Admiral Standley

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parity in submarines. The treaty also fixed the age at which obsolete or "over age" ships might be replaced by new construction, but provided that no capital ship be replaced before the expiration of the treaty of 1936.

As a result of the limitations imposed by these treaties, the composition of our fleet, when up to full treaty strength, would be: 15 battleships, 6 aircraft carriers, 35 cruisers, 97 destroyers and 50 submarines. A great many "over age" obsolete ships, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 65 destroyers and 30 submarines would have to be laid down before 1936 to give us all under age ships. While we will be compelled to retain these old ships in service for training purposes, they are of little value as fighting ships if opposed to modern ones—about the same value as an automobile made twenty years ago would be compared to a 1934 streamline model. To obtain replacements for these obsolete ships is today our chief concern.

Recent Navy Appropriations

1. By executive order of the President, June 16, 1933, the Navy was allotted, out of National Recovery Act funds, \$238,000,000 for new construction of naval vessels to be distributed over a period of three years. The vessels to be built will be distributed in the various categories as follows:

- 2 Aircraft Carriers
- 4 Cruisers
- 20 Destroyers
- 4 Submarines
- 2 Gunboats

2. The Navy appropriations bill, H. R. 7199, appropriates \$284,000,000 for the maintenance of the Navy and for the building of one 8-inch-gun cruiser and three 6-inch gun cruisers.

3. The Vinson bill, H. R. 6604, authorizes the replace-

ment of all over-age vessels in the Navy to bring it up to Treaty strength in under-age ships. This will remain in effect as long as The United States is restricted by a treaty.

American, British and Japanese Naval Strength Under Washington and London Treaties

Total Tonnage Built.	Ships	Tons
United States	375	1,059,790
Great Britain	275	1,151,051
Japan	221	758,261
Total Built, over-age, December 31, 1933		
United States	288	330,110
Great Britain	138	175,262
Japan	55	102,136
Total Built, under-age, December 31, 1933		
United States	87	729,680
Great Britain	137	975,789
Japan	166	656,125
Total in course of Construction or appropriated for.		
United States	53	240,930
Great Britain	64	185,610
Japan	45	123,132
Additional Tonnage, not Appropriated for which is needed to replace over-age ships.		
United States		272,980
Great Britain		4,652
Japan		None

Cost of the World War

According to the "Statistical Survey of the World War" prepared by Col. Leonard P. Ayres, Chief, Statistical Branch, General Staff, U. S. Army, the cost of the World War to the Nations involved up to April 30, 1919, was: (in billions of dollars).

Allied Powers: Great Britain and Dominions 38; France, 26; United States, 22; Russia, 18; Italy, 13; Belgium, Rumania and Yugoslavia, 5; Japan and Greece, 1. Total Allies, 123.

Central Powers

Germany, 39; Austria-Hungary, 21; Turkey and Bulgaria, 3. Total Central Powers, 63. Grand total all countries, \$186,000,000,000.

According to the annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury 1930, the total expenditures of the United States on account of the war amounted to \$51,546,619,440.72, which includes post-war costs attributable to the war. Receipts, including payments on foreign debts, sale of surplus material, etc., amount to \$4,483,046,569.99. Her assets, partly estimated, including sums owing for sale of surplus property and payments due on foreign debts, are given as \$9,189,664,380.37.

Deducting receipts and assets from total expenditures this leaves the net war cost to the United States \$37,873,908,409.36.

The 73d Congress « « Now in Session

Duration—March 4, 1933–March 4, 1935. First Session Convened March 9, 1933; Adjourned June 16, 1933. Second Session Convened January 3, 1934.

In the Senate

Membership
Total—96

60 Democrats

35 Republicans

1 Farmer-Labor

Presiding Officer

President: John N. Garner, D.
Vice-President of the United States

Floor Leaders

Majority Leader

Joseph T. Robinson, Ark., D.

Minority Leader

Charles L. McNary, Ore., R.

Officers

President Pro Tempore

Key Pittman, Nev., D.

Secretary

Edwin A. Halsey

Sergeant at Arms

Chealey W. Jurney

Chaplain

Dr. ZeBarney Thorne Phillips,
D. D.

In the House

Membership
Total—435

313 Democrats

115 Republicans

5 Farmer-Labor

2 Vacancies

Presiding Officer

Speaker: Henry T. Rainey, D.
Member of the House from Illinois

Floor Leaders

Majority Leader

Joseph W. Byrns, Tenn., D.

Minority Leader

Bertrand H. Snell, N. Y., R.

Officers

Clerk of the House

South Trimble, Ky.

Sergeant at Arms

Kenneth Romney

Doorkeeper

Joseph J. Sinnott

Chaplain

Rev. James Shera Montgomery, D. D.

Progress Made by Major Legislation

From February 27 to March 28, 1934

Appropriations

On March 15, three of the ten annual supply bills had been passed by Congress and signed by the President; two more had passed both houses and were in conference, two more had passed both houses and were awaiting action by the House or Senate amendments, while one had been reported to the House.

Following was the status of all appropriation bills on March 15:

Passed and signed by the President; Interior Department, Navy Department and Treasury and Post Office.

Passed by both houses and in conference:

Independent offices and State, Justice, Commerce and Labor Departments.

Passed by both houses and awaiting House action or Senate amendments; Agriculture and War Departments.

Reported to House; Legislative Bill. Still to be reported from House Committee on Appropriations; District of Columbia and, if necessary, Deficiency Bill.

This means that Congress is well up to its schedule on the supply bills. The highly controversial appropriation bill is the Independent Offices Bills, to which amendments were attached providing for soldier bonus and restoration of pay for government employes.

Air Mail

Out of the more or less sensational discussion arising out of President Roosevelt's cancellation of the contracts for carrying air mail by commercial aviation companies has come a definite piece of legislation introduced by Senator J. C. O'Mahoney, Wyoming, D. former First Assistant Postmaster General under Postmaster General Farley providing the restoration of airmail carrying to private concerns.

The O'Mahoney bill provides that bids shall be made to carry the air mail on a basis of pay for actual mail carried and seems more likely to receive Congressional approval than the drastic Administration bill introduced by Senators McKellar, D. Tenn. and Black, D. Ala.

The O'Mahoney bill carries out, in general, the recommendations made to the committee on Post Offices and Post Roads by Col. Charles A. Lindbergh and other aviation experts. It is expected that, in anticipation of the passage of the O'Mahoney bill, the Post Office Department will shortly announce new terms under which the

Department will accept bids from commercial companies. It is understood that the companies whose contracts were cancelled by the President will not be barred from bidding for new contracts.

Government Securities

On March 15, the Senate adopted a resolution (S. Res. 209) offered by Senator Couzens, Mich. R., calling on the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish the Senate with the following information.

"(a) A list of all Government securities offered to the public during the present fiscal year, together with the terms of each such offering. (b) The allotments made of each such offering, specifying in each case the amount allotted (1) to Federal Reserve banks, (2) to member banks of the Federal Reserve System, (3) to banks not members of the Federal Reserve System, (4) to insurance companies, (5) to corporations other than insurance companies, and (6) to private individuals, together with the market price of all outstanding Government securities at the time such allotments were made."

Senator Couzens informed the Senate that the information was desired by the Senate Committee on Finance, which is considering legislation for the taxing of banks on the cost of handling non-negotiable securities.

Cotton

On March 18 the House passed (H. R. 8402) introduced by Representative Bankhead, Ala. D. providing for a prohibitive tax on cotton over the amount allowed each cotton grower under the A.A.A. is expected to be passed by both houses before the end of the session.

On February 10, the Senate Committee on Agriculture reported S. 1974 by Senator John H. Bankhead, a brother of Representative William B. Bankhead. On March 22, the Senate, by unanimous consent, substituted H. R. 8402 for S. 1974, and began its consideration.

The following statement as to the purposes of the Bankhead bill was contained in the report on it by the House Committee on Agriculture.

"This bill is designed to supplement the cotton program of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Further legislation is necessary in order to promote, during this emergency period, the effective and profitable marketing of cotton and to assure a stabilized cotton agricultural industry. That stabilization is needed in the disposition of cotton in interstate and foreign commerce is shown by the recent history of fluctuating production and marketing and depressed prices as a consequence thereof.

"Even in the generally prosperous year of 1926 the Cotton Belt was thrown into a period of depression by an excessively large cotton crop. The yearly average market price for cotton fell from 30.1 cents per pound in 1923-24 to 14.4 cents per pound in 1926-27 as production rose from 10,140,000 bales to 17,978,000 bales. The excessive crop of 1926 not only glutted the market and depressed prices but resulted in an excessive carry-over that was a burden on the market the following year. Experiences of this type have become a commonplace in Cotton Belt agriculture.

"During the present depression, however, the need for stabilization became more amply demonstrated than ever

before. After exceeding 15,000,000 bales annually for 3 consecutive years, world consumption of American cotton in 1929-30 fell to 13,000,000 bales and in 1930-31 fell to less than 11,000,000 bales. Although the production of cotton became unprofitable, the crops in these 2 years amounted to 14,800,000 and 13,900,000 bales, respectively. The world carry-over of American cotton rose practically to twice the 1929 level. Then came the 17,000,000-bale crop of 1931. The supply for 1931-32 was practically 26,000,000 bales, over twice the world consumption of American cotton for the year, and the price for the year averaged only 5.89 cents per pound at the 10 spot markets. Nearly 13,000,000 bales of American cotton were carried over into the following year compared with 4,500,000 bales at the beginning of the 1929-30 cotton year. Of course, the general level of commodity prices and demand conditions have a very important effect on cotton prices but the South has learned the importance of supply as illustrated in the following figures: In 1923-24 when the world supply of American cotton, including the carryover, was 13,400,000 bales, the price averaged 30.1 cents per pound. In 1926-27, with a supply of 23,500,000 bales, the price averaged 14.4 cents per pound. In 1931-32 when the supply was 26,000,000 bales, the price averaged 5.89 cents per pound. Had the whole crop of 1933 been permitted to mature the supply this year would have been 29,000,000 bales or over.

"Recognizing that another extraordinarily large crop was being grown in the summer of 1933 when the welfare of the South, and all parts of the country that market their products in the South, depended upon the limitation of the cotton surplus, cotton growers cooperated in the program of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and plowed up approximately one-fourth of their cotton acreage last summer. Their efforts prevented a probable catastrophe to the South.

"The sign-up campaign for the 1934 program has just been completed, and again a large percentage of the cotton growers have cooperated in the program. However, the rental and benefit payments that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration is able to make under these programs are necessarily small in comparison with the price at which cotton will sell if the surplus is eliminated. It is now recognized throughout the Cotton Belt that the success of these programs requires the subordination of individual interests to the general welfare. By refusing to take part in the program and by expanding their cotton acreage, those who do not cooperate can destroy the voluntary adjustment programs.

"This bill is designed to make cooperation effective by preventing those who do not cooperate from destroying the cotton-adjustment program. That policy, along with the policy of protecting the marketing by cooperators, is accomplished by the levy of a tax on the excess of cotton going into interstate and foreign commerce detrimentally to the whole cotton industry. With this tax noncooperators will probably receive as much for their cotton after paying the tax as they would receive without a tax if production were to be uncontrolled.

"Revenue will be needed if rental payments are to be continued or are to be increased. This bill provides for raising revenue and if the amount of funds capable of being devoted to the cotton program can be increased thereby the desirable policy of furthering the cotton program of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration can be stimulated."

Philippine Independence

On March 24, President Roosevelt signed the Philippine Independence bill. The important provisions of the bill are:

1. Authorization for the adoption of the constitution and the institution of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands pending the withdrawal of American sovereignty and complete independence. The interim government to be autonomous, subject to certain reservations intended for a safeguard of the sovereignty and the responsibilities of the United States.

2. Pending the withdrawal of American sovereignty, certain Philippine products to be imported free of duty, but not to exceed specified limitations.

3. Immigration to the United States is limited to a maximum annual quota of 50, pending independence.

4. On July 4, immediately following the expiration of a period of 10 years from the date of the institution of the Commonwealth government, American sovereignty will be withdrawn and final and complete independence of the Philippine Islands formally recognized. Thereupon, the Philippine Islands will become a country foreign to the United States.

5. The United States agrees to relinquish all reservations now designated for the use of the United States Army after the institution of the independent government, but reserves the right, at its discretion, to retain and maintain naval bases and fueling stations in the Philippine Islands.

6. The feasibility of further retaining and maintaining naval bases and fueling stations in the Philippine Islands after the independent government is constituted, will be the subject of conferences between the two governments.

St. Lawrence Waterway

On March 14, the Senate defeated ratification of the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty between the United States and Canada by a vote of 46 to 42 for the treaty resolution. A two-thirds vote is necessary for ratification.

The Administration has not given up hope of final ratification and the matter will probably be brought up again at the next session of Congress.

Silver

On March 19, the House passed the Silver bill (H. R. 7581) introduced by Representative Dies, Tex., D. This bill authorizes the appointment of a board composed of the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Agriculture to negotiate with foreign buyers with the view of selling American agricultural surplus products at the world market price and to accept in payment therefor silver coin or bullion at such value as may be agreed upon which shall not exceed 25 per cent above the world market price of silver, and to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to issue silver certificates based upon the agreed value of such silver bullion or coin in payment for the products sold, and for other purposes.

In the Senate the bill was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, which is expected to hold hearings on this and all other Silver bills pending in the Senate. It is expected that the Dies bill will be amended and reported.

Tariff

On March 17 the House Committee on Ways and Means reported H. R. 8687 to amend the Tariff Act of 1930. The measure gives the President permanent authority to effect reciprocal tariff agreements with foreign nations without participation in such action by Congress.

The bill is sure to arouse bitter controversy in both the House and the Senate and what its final form will be cannot be predicted at this time.

Taxes

On February 21, the House passed H. R. 7835 the Administration Tax bill. On March 28, the Senate Committee on Finance reported the bill with amendments. The provisions of the bill are described in the Senate Committee report as follows:

"The House bill provides for additional revenue estimated at \$258,000,000 in a full year of operation. This additional revenue is to be derived to a large extent from measures adopted to prevent tax avoidance. Your committee is in complete agreement with the policy of preventing such avoidance. However, some of the changes proposed to existing law by the House bill, in the opinion of your committee, would have an unfavorable effect on business and would prevent only an inconsequential amount of tax avoidance. Some modifications in the House bill, therefore, are recommended. Your committee recommends increasing the revenue provided for in the House bill by imposing the capital-stock and excess-profits taxes patterned after those levied by the National Industrial Recovery Act. It also recommends an increase in the estate-tax rates in the case of net estates of over \$1,000,000. These measures are believed necessary, first, because of the heavy emergency expenditures of the Government, and, second, because of the fact that many excise taxes under existing law will be automatically repealed on July 1, 1935. The capital-stock and excess-profits taxes, if imposed on a permanent basis, will add stability to our tax system and will produce sufficient additional revenue to give assurance of a balanced Budget by 1936. It is estimated that in a full year of operation the Senate bill will return additional revenue of \$330,000,000, or approximately \$72,000,000 more than the House bill.

"The estimated additional revenue mentioned is shown in detail as follows:

(1) Capital-stock and excess-profits taxes	\$95,000,000
(2) Increases in estate tax rates.....	7,000,000
(3) Changes in income-tax rate structure	20,000,000
(4) Administration of depreciation allowances	85,000,000
(5) Capital gains and losses.....	30,000,000
(6) Personal holding companies (directly or indirectly)	20,000,000
(7) Exchanges and reorganizations.....	10,000,000
(8) Consolidated returns	20,000,000
(9) Partnerships	5,000,000
(10) Administrative changes (gasoline and lubricating oil)	18,000,000
(11) Miscellaneous provisions	20,000,000
Total	330,000,000

The Class Room Studies

National Defense

How Students in Government May Consider Army and Navy Legislation

IN CONSIDERING the question of National Defense, the class in government faces a problem which, in some of its phases, is one of the oldest problems in the world and in others a problem as new and variable as to cause sharp differences of opinion among experts.

It is old because National defense was born when the first savage chief hired or conscripted a couple of warriors as a body guard. All tribes and nations have found it necessary to make some provision for their self-protection against aggression. As nations developed, the regular paid Army and Navy came into being, their size being dependent upon the degree of danger of attack a nation considered itself facing.

The traditional American policy has been to maintain an Army and Navy merely for defensive purposes. The geographical position of the United States is such that a large Army has never been necessary, because the only points of land attack on the United States are the Canadian and Mexican borders.

The relationship between the United States and Canada has been such that for more than a hundred years there has not been a fortification along the Canadian-American boundary line.

With the exception of the trouble arising out of the raids of Pancho Villa, the Mexican revolutionist, in 1914, when American troops were sent into Mexico, there has been no serious trouble between the United States and Mexico since the Mexican War of 1846.

From the Civil War of 1861-65 down to the Spanish War of 1898 the only fighting done by American troops was against the Indians. In the Spanish War the fighting was confined to short engagements in Cuba and the fighting in the Philippines against the insurrectionists. With the exception of the Civil War the American Government has never, since the Revolution, been called upon to raise and equip an army of any great size.

The general policy regarding the Army has been to keep it small, but up to date and capable of expansion in case of need. The main arm of American National Defense for many years has been the Navy, the object being to have a fleet the equal of that of any other power for the protection of American coasts and American commerce.

It is when a decision is to be reached as to how large an Army and how large a Navy is needed for national defense that the differences of opinion arise.

Leaving out the advocates of total disarmament, who represent the extreme end of one side of the argument, the main point of differences between those engaged in the controversy may be stated thus:

Advocates of a strong system of national defense take the view that the best way for America to avoid being

drawn into a war is for America to have such an army and navy that any nation would hesitate to bring on a war with her.

Those who oppose this theory take the position that the very building of strong armies and navies enhances the prospects of war, because such action on the part of one nation forces other nations to take similar action for fear the first nation will be tempted to use its armed forces for an aggressive war. This, they maintain, leads to an endless chain of war preparation.

Both sides are at present citing conditions in Europe and Asia in support of their contentions.

Advocates of limitations of armies and navies insist that if all other weapons against war were conscientiously exercised by the nations, reduction of armaments would inevitably follow. To this end they insist that America should set an example to the rest of the world by keeping her own armed forces down to a minimum.

Those of the opposing viewpoint to China as a shining example of non-preparedness, citing her loss of Manchuria to the armed forces of Japan as a particular case in point.

They also stress the fact that, whereas America has striven to bring about a genuine reduction of naval armaments and has set an example in this respect for the past 12 years—ever since the Washington Treaty of 1922—her efforts have been to no avail.

With these two main arguments on a general policy of national defense considered, the student then comes to another phase of the problem.

That is, if we are to provide for National Defense in the shape of armed forces, what is the best policy to pursue? On this point disagreement is pronounced, not only among laymen, but among military experts as well.

The most outstanding topic of controversy is, of course, aviation.

On this topic there are many degrees of differences. The died-in-the-wool aircraft enthusiast would scrap all ground forces in the army, except those attached to aviation, and all seagoing vessels except airplane carriers, and leave the entire task of defense to aircraft. Others would have aircraft the major feature of both land and sea defense forces, with other branches of the army and navy minimized.

On the other side, the uses of aircraft are frankly admitted, but are limited, with the other branches of the two services considered the important, ultimately dependable factors. In this number of the Digest will be found discussion of all the major controversial points of the aircraft question.

Representative McSwain, explains carefully the provisions and purposes of his bills for an enlarged air force. General MacArthur gives the viewpoint of the General Staff on modern trends in warfare, and Secretary of War Dorn gives the Department's view of the relationship of aircraft to the general military problem.

Senator Hale explains the treaties for the limitation of naval armaments. Representative Vinson explains his bills to bring the American Navy up to treaty strength and Admiral Standley, who, as Chief of Naval Operations, holds a position analogous to that of General MacArthur as Chief of Staff of the Army, gives the Navy viewpoint.

The views of opponents of further increases in military and naval forces will be found in the Pro and Con sections.

The Students' Question Box

Q. Is it true that Senator David Rice Atchison of Missouri, President of the United States for twenty-four hours, from noon on March 4 to noon on March 5, 1849?

A. No.

David Rice Atchison was elected to the United States Senate as a Whig in 1843 to fill the unexpired term of Lewis Linn, who died in that year. He was later elected President Pro Tempore of the Senate and was holding that position when his term as Senator expired at noon on March 3, 1849. In the meantime he had been re-elected to succeed himself as a Senator from Missouri.

Zachary Taylor was elected President in 1848 and was due to take office on March 4, 1849.

But March 4 of that year fell on Sunday and Taylor did not want to be sworn in on that day, so his inauguration was postponed until noon of Monday, March 5.

The term of office of President Polk expired on March 4 at noon, and that left the Presidential office vacant. What was the condition of affairs, then, between noon on March 4, and noon March 5—

The answer is that the United States was technically without a President for those 24 hours, although with President-elect Taylor in Washington, any emergency could have been met by his immediately taking the oath of office.

The story that Senator Atchison was President is due to the fact that, under the law at that time, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, in the event of the death of the President and Vice President, succeeded to the Presidency. Both President-elect Taylor and Vice President-elect Millard Fillmore being alive, Atchison was precluded from becoming President on that score. But even if they had died, Atchison would still have been disbarred from being President for the 24 hours of March 4-5, because he was not actually a Senator during that period. Senators are elected for specific terms of six years. Atchison's first term had expired and, although he had been reelected to a second term, he had not qualified by taking the oath of office, which, under the law, must be taken during an open session of the Senate.

What happened was that, on March 5, when the Senate convened, Atchison, because of his position of importance in the Senate, as an individual, was given the oath of office immediately and, as soon as he had taken the oath and thus become a qualified member of the Senate, he

was promptly re-elected President Pro Tempore of the Senate in order that he might administer the oath to the other Senators-elect.

As soon as this had been done, the Senate and House met in joint session in the Hall of the House where Zachary Taylor took the oath of office.

If both Taylor and Fillmore had died on March 5, immediately after the swearing in of Atchison as Senator and his election as President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and before either Taylor or Fillmore had taken the oath of office, Atchison would then automatically have become President designate.

But he could not actually have become President until he took the oath of office.

No one can hold any office of responsibility under the Government of the United States without first having taken the oath prescribed by law.

In 1886 Congress passed the Presidential Succession Act, making members of the Cabinet, in a fixed order, succeed to the presidency in the event of the death of both the President and Vice President. The order of succession is as follows:

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Postmaster General, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture.

The Secretaries of Commerce and of Labor are not included in the Act since these departments were not in existence at the time the act was passed.

Q. Is there now or has there at any time been a law prohibiting the President of the United States from leaving the country during his tenure of office?

A. No.

At one time a more or less popular sentiment existed against the President's leaving the country, the feeling being founded on belief that the Chief Executive should always be on hand to meet any emergency that might arise.

The first President to leave the boundaries of the United States while in office was President Grant, who took a vacation trip to Mexico.

President Wilson upset the popular prejudice entirely by going to the Paris Peace Conference following the World War.

AFTERMATH:—

Progress of Problems Discussed in Special Features of Preceding 1934 Numbers of the Digest

Gold

(January, 1934)

The Administration's gold policy remains unchanged. The question is no longer in the controversial stage but for the present, at least, has become merely a matter of routine business for the Treasury Department.

Federal Aid in Education

(February, 1934)

The Ellzey bill appropriating \$3,000,000 a year for three years, for aid in vocational education has been reported by the House Committee on Education and the author, Representative Ellzey, Miss., D., has applied to the Committee on Rules for a special rule for its consideration by the House. Mr. Ellzey expects the bill to pass both houses of Congress at this session.

The Ellzey bill continues the provisions of the George-Reed Act, appropriating \$1,000,000 a year for training in agriculture; \$1,000,000 a year for home economics training and \$1,000,000 a year for training in trades and industry.

Following hearings on the various bills for Federal Aid to public schools by the House Committee on Education, Chairman Douglas, Mass., D., of that committee appointed a subcommittee to study and report on these measures. In addition to Chairman Douglas the members of this subcommittee are Fletcher, O., and Ellzey, Miss., Democrats, and Carter, Calif., and Bakewell, Conn., Republicans. It is expected that the subcommittee will draft a bill and have it ready for the full committee early in April.

On February 28 and again on March 7, the House

Committee on Banking and Currency held hearings on the various pending bills providing for the refinancing of public school systems by funds from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This is "Step 4" in the program of the Advisory Committee on Federal Aid in Education. The House Banking and Currency Committee has a mass of other Legislation before it and it is too early to predict when it will take up these bills.

In the meantime educators and others interested in the passage of all educational measures are continuing to supply members of the House and Senate with full and accurate information on the school situation in every section of the country.

Food and Drugs Act

(March, 1934)

The Food and Drugs Act, S. 2800, was reported to the Senate on March 15, and, as the Digest goes to press, the bill is on the Senate Calendar awaiting action. As to its prospects, Senator Royal S. Copeland, N. Y., D., author of the bill, made the following authorized statement to the Digest:

"The Food and Drugs bill, now on the Senate Calendar, should be reached about the middle of April, or shortly before. The tariff bill and other impending measures are ahead of it and their consideration will delay discussion of the Food and Drugs until that time.

"The bill is in good shape and I fully expect it to pass the Senate at this session."

It is a foregone conclusion that the Food and Drugs bill will receive full discussion on the floor of the Senate. The mere fact that the Senate takes it up for consideration does not mean that it will be acted upon promptly, but it does mean that it is in a position where it will have to be disposed of one way or another.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THIS NUMBER

1. (Hale) Congressional Record March 6, 1934.
2. (McSwain) Congressional Record February 14, 1934.
3. (MacArthur) Annual Report, Chief of Staff, 1933.
4. (Dern) Letter to Representative McSwain February 21, 1934.

5. (Hagood) Address before Knife and Fork Club, Kansas City, April 4, 1933.
6. (Morrow) Report of President's Aircraft Board, Dwight W. Morrow Chairman, November 30, 1925.
7. (Peace Societies) Letter of Peace Societies to President Roosevelt, March 26, 1934.

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